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Abstract
Conscientious objection within health care is defined as a refusal to comply with a 
medically sanctioned request based on personal moral, or religious moral reasons. 
Although conscientious objection is an important foundation in bioethics, most research 
has focused on the legitimacy of its use by individual health care professionals. The 
following ethical analysis examines the ethical implications of Catholic hospital 
conscientious objections to providing reproductive services to which they are morally 
opposed within the context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically 
within rural areas. Conclusions o f the analysis suggest that hospitals do not possess a 
conscience according to the dominant view of conscience in bioethics and that limitations 
on the objections of Catholic hospitals are warranted in a number of important 
circumstances, many of which include rural areas. This analysis will help further the 
limited body of knowledge concerning conscientious objections by Catholic hospitals in 
Canada and inform future health policy decisions.
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1.1 Problem Statement & Purpose
In the summer of 2007, the peaceful town of Midland, Ontario, Canada, population 
16,000, was unwillingly thrust into the limelight when the reproductive health services on 
which they relied were threatened (Gandhi, 2007). Following a year of closed-door 
discussions, on June 15, 2007, trustees of the region’s only two hospitals - Huronia 
General Hospital (secular) and Penetanguishene General Hospital (Roman Catholic) not 
five kilometers away - voted to merge (Gandhi, 2007). What was troubling to both health 
care professionals (HCPs) and community members regarding this merger, however, was 
they proposed to do so as a Catholic organization. This would result in the immediate loss 
of a number of reproductive services to the community as well as to the region. As news 
of the merger spread, so did public opposition. Finally, on August 2nd 2007, after 
resignations from four Huronia General Board members (including the Chair) and six
physicians from the Huronia District Medical Advisory Council, as well as mounting
■ . . ■ . . . \ 
protests from the community and surrounding regions, the proposed merger was reversed
(Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, 2007; Glynn, 2007a, 2007b; “Simcoe county
hospital”, 2007): ' : : ; -  . : ; ,
Although Midland was successful in preserving access to its full complement of 
reproductive services, the same cannot be said for others. A case in point was the removal 
of tubal ligations from the services provided by St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Humboldt, 
Saskatchewan in 2006. This procedure was found to be contrary to the Health Ethics 
Guide (Catholic Health Association of Canada [now Catholic Health Alliance of Canada]
2
[CHAC], 2000) and as such was discontinued in the rural community, at first completely 
and then after significant public pressure, for birth control purposes only (Yaworski, 
2007). ' ’■ •■■■• • . ' ' - -
As these cases suggest, while the provision of health care by Catholic hospitals, or 
mergers between secular and Catholic hospitals, may seem harmless at first, a closer 
examination reveals they can pose significant barriers to accessing certain reproductive 
health care services. This is because religious philosophy is allowed to justify refusals to 
provide services, therapies, and procedures that contradict their guiding religious values. 
Thus the scope of services offered by Catholic hospitals, as opposed to secular hospitals, 
is directed by the doctrine and principles of the Roman Catholic Church, and not always 
by medical guidelines or the needs of the community it serves. '
Prohibited or immoral interventions include: Abortion; sterilization (e.g., vasectomies 
and tubal ligations) for birth control purposes; cryopreservation; artificial insemination by 
a donor; in vitro fertilization; surrogacy; and “means that deliberately and intentionally 
interfere with the procreative aspect in sexual intercourse” (CHAC, 2000, p.40, article 
50). To varying degrees and circumstances, these means can include refusals to dispense
condoms, hormonal contraception, and emergency contraception (EC) (CHAC, 2000).
. \ ' ■
Interestingly, final decisions relating to services that are and are not provided are often 
left to the local Bishop (McGowan, 2005; Roche, 2010; D. MacDermott, personal . 
communication, September 20, 2010; J. Roche, personal communication, September 17, 
2010). Because the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) is a ‘guide’ and not a 
compendium of directives, differences in opinion or interpretation by local Bishops can 
lead to variability in services offered amongst Catholic hospitals across the country.
3
- Although a popular and important foundation in bioethics, research and discussion 
about conscientious objection has usually focused on the legitimacy of its use by 
individual health practitioners (Alta Charo, 2005; Blustein, 1993; Brock, 2008; Cantor & 
Baum, 2004; Card, 2007; Savulescu, 2006; Fenton & Lomasky, 2005; Wicclair, 2000). A 
review of the literature reveals a significant gap in the research addressing the legitimacy 
of religiously affiliated hospitals to conscientiously object to services that contradict their 
guiding religious beliefs (Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004; Gallagher 
&Goodstein, 2002; Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy, 2008; 
Wicclair, 2011; Wildes, 1997). Less research still, addresses the issue within Canada or 
in rural areas (Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). In order to address the gap, the purpose of 
this thesis is to examine the ethical implications of Catholic hospital conscientious 
objections to provide reproductive services to which they are morally opposed within the 
context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically within rural areas.
In the following sections I further discuss the topic of conscientious objection, the 
history and current status of Catholic hospitals in Canada, and the unique nature of the 
rural Canadian context. I conclude by outlining the methods used as well as proposing the 
two focal questions for analysis.
1.2 Gonscientious Objection
Conscientious objection within health care, also known as conscientious refusal, is 
defined as a refusal to comply with a medically sanctioned request based on personal 
moral, or religious moral reasons (Childress, 1979, 1985). In this respect, refusing to 
offer requested services is not due to a lack of expertise or of resources, but because
4
. doing so would represent a fundamental moral conflict for the individual HCP or 
institution. For the purposes of this thesis I will use the terms conscientious objection and 
conscientious refusal interchangeably.
The place of conscientious refusals within health care remains an important topic of 
discussion within the discipline of bioethics, as well as within relevant academic (e.g., 
philosophy, theology, health law and policy) and professional-practice discourse (e.g., 
relevant policy recommendations, guidelines, statements, and opinion pieces specific to 
the practice of nursing, pharmacy, midwifery, medicine, etc). Indeed, the topic continues 
to generate debate not just in North America, but also in many other comers of the globe, 
as media outlets, legislators, religious leaders, bioethicists, variousHCPs, and the general 
public weigh in on the morally appropriate limits to conscientious objections to health 
care services, within applicable national and international contexts (Alarcon, 2009; Card, 
2011; Casas, 2009; Cook & Dickens, 1999; Kelly, Ellis & Rosenthal, 2011; Mishtal, 
2009; Sacchini & Antico, 2000; Van Bogaert, 2002).
Fueled in part, perhaps, by the lightning speed in which medical advancements occur, 
procedures and interventions in their infancy a mere ten to twenty years ago are now 
common practice. This rapid evolution of medical options has caused some to question 
their role in delivering services to which they object (Curlin, Lawrence, Chin & Lantos, 
2007). Presumably, as progress is made, the lines between what we can and what we
. . . ■ i ;
should do, will only continue to blur, thus leading to increased rates of conscientious 
refusals; In addition, Benjamin (1995) suggests: 1) the intimate involvement of our 
personal convictions regarding the “nature and meaning of creating, sustaining, and 
ending life” (p.515); 2) the potential for radical value differences between HCPs,
5
.patients, and families; and 3) the frequent need for “agreement and cooperation on a 
single course o f action” (p.515), will only continue to contribute to the prevalence of 
appeals to conscience in bioethics.
There are a number of procedures, interventions, and services in health care to which 
individuals can object1. However, “the most common examples in the literature and in 
day-to-day medical practice continue to involve reproductive medicine: specifically, the 
provision of therapeutic abortion services and access to contraceptive devices and 
medication” (Blackmer, 2007, p.16). Most recently, debates have focused on the 
conscientious refusals of pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception (Alarcon, 
2009; Cantor & Baum, 2004; Fenton & Lomasky, 2005; Davidson,JPettis, Joiner, Cook & 
Klugman, 2010; Kelly et al., 2011; Wicclair, 2006) and whether HCPs have an obligation 
to inform, treat, or refer patients for reproductive interventions to which they object 
(Blustein, 1993; Brock, 2008; Chervenak & McCullough, 2008; Dickens & Cook, 2000; 
May & Aulisio, 2009; McLeod, 2008; Savulescu, 2006).
Arguments can, and have been made, on all sides of the conscientious objection 
debate. Potential advantages of allowing HCPs to invoke conscience include permitting 
them to remain true to their morals and values, thus preserving their personal integrity, as 
well as supporting the exercise of independent judgment (Cantor & Baum, 2004;
1 Other areas o f  conscientious refusal include, but are not limited to: euthanasia, physician assisted suicide, 
experimentation on human embryos, the rejection o f blood products by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the 
prescription o f human growth hormone (HGH) to short but otherwise normal children, and the removal or 
continuation o f patients from or on artificial life support (Benjamin, 1995; Blackmer, 2007).
. Wicclair, 2000). Allowing individuals to refuse participation in acts that violate their ' 
personal, ethical, moral, or religious convictions is also an essential element of a free and 
democratic society (Benjamin, 1995; Cantor & Baum, 2004; Pellegrino, 2002). On the 
other hand, “in the biomedical context, respect for conscience may be inconvenient, 
inefficient, or detrimental to medical outcomes” (Benjamin, 1995, p.515). It may also 
serve to impose the values and personal morals of the HCP, while neglecting those of the 
patient (Savulescu, 2006). In face of these arguments, the salient question becomes: how 
do we manage to be respectful of a HCP’s (or hospital’s) conscience, while also 
safeguarding the patient’s reproductive health and entitlement to autonomy and self­
determination?
Although the debate regarding the precise scope of legitimate conscientious objection 
continues, it is generally accepted that individual HCPs may refuse, within limits, to 
provide services and medications, as well as refuse to directly participate in procedures, 
to which they morally oppose. In Canada a number of different professional associations
* . . . ■ ' *y * <
and regulatory colleges have released relevant policy statements and guidelines on or 2
2 Of note, professional codes o f  ethics provided by national associations such as the Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA) (2004), the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) (2008), and the National Association 
o f Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities (NAPRA) (1999), are guidelines provided from within the profession 
relevant to its members. In contrast, practice standards outlined by professional colleges such as the 
College o f  Physicians and Surgeons o f  New Brunswick (CPSNB) (2002), and the College o f Registered 
Nurses o f British Columbia (CRNBC) (2010), outline the criteria for which professionals are held 
accountable to the public. That being said, each may be used to indicate those values o f  importance to 
professionals. . : -
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.related to the topic (Novel Tech. Ethics, 2010). For instance, both the Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA) (1988, 2004) and the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) (2008) 
agree that physicians and nurses should be permitted to follow their conscience, as long 
as it does not unduly burden patients or compromise their well-being. This position is 
also supported by a number of the provincial regulatory colleges (College of Nurses of 
Ontario [CNO], 2009; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta [CPSA], 2010; 
College of Physicians and Surgeons ofNew Brunswick [CPSNB], 2002; College of 
Pharmacists of British Columbia [CPBC], 2010; Saskatchewan College of Pharmacists 
[SCP], 2000). For nurses who do wish to object, the CNA states that refusals cannot be 
“based on prejudice, fear, or convenience” (CNA, 2008, p.45). Although each 
organization’s statements are slightly different, doctors, nurses, and pharmacists must 
generally inform either the person requesting the service, or management, of their reasons 
for objecting, and as much as possible should do so in advance of any request (CMA, 
1988; CPSA, 2010; CPSNB, 2002; National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory
Authorities [NAPRA], 1999; Nova Scotia College of Pharmacists [NSCP], 2007; SCP,
' . \
2000). This practice allows for alternate arrangements to be made so that a patient’s 
choice for the procedure or medication is not significantly affected. :
In contrast to the prolific debate regarding the conscientious objections of individual 
HCPs, little attention has been paid to the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals 
(Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004; Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002; 
Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy, 2008; Wicclair, 2011; Wildes, 
1997). Fewer still have addressed the unique concerns o f the rural environment or a 
Canadian focus (Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). While certain points of debate may be
8
- similar, there are a number of issues that require special attention and analysis. These 
particularities will be addressed in the analysis -  chapters two and three.
1.3 Catholic Health Care
, The Catholic Church maintains a steadfast commitment to fulfilling the teachings of 
Jesus Christ in a manner that espouses his compassion and healing presence (CHAC, 
2000; McGowan, 2005). Faithful to its mission of administering care to the poor, the 
vulnerable, the sick, and the suffering, the Catholic Church remains “ ...the single largest 
provider of health care in the world, truly faithful to the mission given by Christ to teach 
and to heal” (McGowan, 2005). Globally, the Church is responsible for upwards of
111.000 Catholic health care institutions -  this comprises approximately 6,000 hospitals;
17.000 clinics and primary care institutions; 12,000 homes for the aging and chronically 
ill; 800 leprosariums; and 25,300 centers of health care ministry (McGowan, 2005). 
Furthermore, 26.7% of the centers around the world providing treatment for people
infected with HIV/AIDS are Catholic-based (Barragán, 2006).
' ' . \
The Catholic Church (recognized judicially as the Holy See3) also plays an influential 
role on the world diplomatic stage. The scope of its involvement includes participating in 
various international organizations, as well as maintaining formal diplomatic
l The “Holy See” is the supreme and central government o f the Roman Catholic Church. It is also 
recognized internationally as possessing a legal personality, allowing it to enter into treaties as the juridical 
equal o f a State and to send and receive diplomatic representatives (U.S. Department o f State, 2008). The 
Holy See is lead by the Pope who exercises ultimate legislative, executive, and judicial power as authorized 
to him through Canon law (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983, Canon 331).
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- relationships with 177 countries. It is also a permanent observer4 to the United Nations, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) (through the World Health Assembly), the World 
Food Program (WFP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) among others (U.S. Department of State, 2008).
1.3.1 Catholic Health Care in Canada
Within Canada, the Roman Catholic Church’s involvement in administering health 
care predates the country itself. In fact three Soeurs of the Augustines Hospitalières 
established the first hospital in North America in 1639 (Hôtel-Dieu) in Québec City, 
Québec (Humbert, 2004). Gradually, other orders of Roman Cathoîîc'Sisters followed 
suit and Catholic hospitals were opened across the country (Humbert, 2004). These 
hospitals include: St-Boniface Hospital, in St-Boniface, New Brunswick (1847) by the 
Grey Sisters; St. Michael’s Hospital, in Toronto, Ontario (1892) by the Sisters of St. 
Joseph; Misericordia General Hospital, in Edmonton, Alberta (1900) by the Soeurs de
4 Observer status is a privilege granted by a number o f Intergovernmental Organizations allowing for the 
participation o f non-member States and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the 
organization’s activities. While observers must generally apply for member status within a fixed number o f  
years, the status o f  permanent observer is reserved for those who do not qualify for full membership or who 
do not wish to become full members but whose participation remains o f mutual benefit (Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum [CSLF], 2005). Permanent Observer status is often based on practice and 
for the United Nations dates from 1946 (United Nations, n.d.). Permanent observers generally have free 
access to meetings and documents, as well as the authority to make presentations and statements but lack 
the ability to vote on resolutions (CSLF, 2005; United Nations, n.d.).
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-Miséricorde; and St. Joseph’s General Hospital, in Comox, British Columbia (1926) by 
the Sisters of St. Joseph, Toronto (Humbert, 2004). v ; : ^  ¡
While the number of Catholic hospitals in Canada has fluctuated throughout the 
years, the total number of Catholic health care facilities currently operating within the 
country is ambiguous. A comprehensive review of the literature, relevant databases, and 
personal communication (September 17, 2010) with the Executive Director of the 
Catholic Health Alliance of Canada (CHAC)5, James Roche, revealed that a 
comprehensive and up to date list of Catholic health care facilities in Canada does not 
presently exist. In order to provide an overview of the number of Catholic hospitals 
currently operating in the country, an inventory of Catholic health care facilities was 
compiled. *
The document was assembled through a systematic review of the Canadian 
Healthcare Association’s, Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (2011). Facilities 
marked as religious (Re/.)6 were noted and wherever possible cross-referenced with
5 The Catholic Health Alliance o f  Canada [CH AC], formerly the Catholic Health Association o f Canada, is 
a nationally based, voluntary alliance o f  Catholic health care providers in Canada. Its mission is to 
“strengthen and support the ministry o f Catholic health care organizations and providers” (CHAC, n.d.b).
Its mandate is 1) Advocacy: “to be the national voice o f Catholic health care organizations” (CHAC, n.d.b), 
and 2) Governance: “to foster the distinctive mission and organizational culture o f Catholic health care 
organizations” (CHAC, n.d.b). They also publish the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000).
6 Health care facilities were defined as religious if  they were “owned and controlled by a church or one o f  
its branches, a religious order, or by a corporation, association, or society with religious objectives” 
(Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011, p.5).
11
.organizational and provincial websites, as well as the online CHAC directory (n.d.a)7. 
Results of the inventory reveal that there are currently 136 Catholic health care facilities 
operating in nine Provinces across the country. Of these 136 facilities, 51 are listed as 
hospitals, 68 are long-term-care facilities, and 17 are a combination of treatment centres, 
hospices, retirement homes, outpatient centres, nursing stations, home care, and others 
(see Appendix A.).
1.3.2 Catholic Health Care Facility Sponsorship
To qualify as a Catholic health care facility, an institution must have a sponsor. 
Sponsors ensure facilities “remain true to Catholic values and identity” (McGowan, 2005, 
p.4). Examples o f sponsors include: religious institutes such as the UrSuline Sisters, the 
Sisters of Providence, and the Grey Nuns; Dioceses such as the Archdiocese of Winnipeg 
and the Diocese of Victoria; and associations or corporations such as the Catholic Health 
Corporation of Ontario and the St. Joseph’s Health Care Society (McGowan, 2005). 
Although sponsors can contribute financially through the administration of foundations 
and land ownership, the operating budgets of Catholic hospitals are allocated by 
provincial governments and administered through their respective funding systems (e.g.,
7 In reviewing the pages o f  the Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association, 
2011) I came across a number o f  institutions that were mis-labeled (e.g., missing the ‘rei’ [religious] 
designation or having the ‘rei’ designation when the facility was no longer religiously affiliated). Although
' . i
every effort was made to cross-reference any facility noted on the CHAC directory list but missed in the 
Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011) or suspected as being 
mis-labeled in the Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011), 
human error is such that a few institutions may have been missed.
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- through regional health authorities)(Canadian Institute for Health Information [CIHI], 
2005; D. MacDermott, personal communication, September 20, 2010). :
As the capacity of founding religious institutes to maintain the governance and 
sponsorship of their health care facilities dwindles, many new entities, in the form of lay 
organizations and societies, have been established to assume the role of sponsor 
(McGowan, 2005; Roche, 2010). In addition to their formal canonical status as public 
juridic persons (PJP)8 o f pontifical or diocesan right, these organizations have also 
adopted corporate status, permitting them reserved authority under both Civil and Canon 
Law (Roche, 2010). For founding institutes, the transfer of authority to a public juridic 
sponsor is generally viewed as a favourable option, as it assures the official continuation 
of the institution’s Catholic ministry as well as their legacy (McGowan, 2005).
In Canada, an example of the PJP of pontifical right model is the Catholic Health 
Sponsors of Ontario, who operate civilly as the Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario 
(CHCO). Operating within a decentralized framework, each sponsored institution 
maintains its own Board of Trustees and chief executive officer (CEO). In order to retain 
oversight, directors of the CHCO sit as members of each institution’s Board, deferring 
certain reserved rights - such as the approval or dismissal of the CEO and directors, as 
well as the spending or sale of major assets - to the board of the CHCO (Roche, 2010).
8 As defined by Canon 116, “public juridic persons are aggregates o f persons or things which are 
established by the competent ecclesiastical authority so that, within the limits allotted to them, they might 
in the name o f the church and in accordance with the provisions o f law, fulfill the specific task entrusted to 
them in view o f the public good” (McGowan, 2005, p.7).
As a PJP of pontifical right, the CHCO is directly accountable to the Vatican (to whom it 
reports annually) for ensuring its sponsored institutions maintain their Catholic identity, 
which includes the consistent application of the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) 
approved by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (Roche, 2010; McGowan, 
2005). , . ;
" Conversely, Catholic Health of Alberta, who acts as a sponsor for all health care 
facilities who fall under Covenant Health Alberta, operates under the PJP of diocesan 
right model. Catholic Health of Alberta’s members include all the Bishops of Alberta 
with the Archbishop of Edmonton as the permanent chairperson. Like the CHCO, 
Catholic Health of Alberta maintains reserved rights but is directly^accountable to the 
Alberta bishops (as opposed to the Holy See) for the promotion of institution Catholicity
th(McGowan, 1999; J. Roche, personal communication, September 17 2010).
As Catholic hospitals seek to provide health care in the twenty-first century, it will be 
interesting to observe how they cope with evolving pressures from society, science, and 
the potentially competing demands these may place on their religious beliefs.
1.4 The Rural Context
The rural health care setting is a unique and challenging environment. Yet despite the 
distinct nature of these communities, there is a significant lack of research surrounding 
those issues most pertinent to them (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Nelson & Schmidek, 
2008; Romanow, 2002; CIHI, 2006). This is compounded by the lack of a singular 
definition of what is meant by the term ‘rural’. Interpretations of the term can for 
instance, be population dependent (less than 10 000 inhabitants), distance dependent (a
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- set number of kilometers away from an urban center), or dependent on social 
representation (culture and way of life) (Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; du Plessis, Beshiri, 
Bollman & Clemenson, 2001, 2002). This variability has led to a great deal of ambiguity 
regarding the meaning o f ‘rural’, making it difficult to pinpoint a precise definition.
For the purpose of this thesis I will assume the ‘rural and small town’ definition of 
rural as outlined by Statistics Canada. According to this definition “rural refers to 
individuals in towns or municipalities outside the commuting zone of larger urban centres 
(with 10,000 or more population)” (du Plessis et al., 2001, p.6). I have chosen this 
definition for two significant reasons: first, because it is recommended by Statistics 
Canada as a starting benchmark for understanding Canada’s rural population; and second 
because it is listed as an appropriate definition for describing issues with a community 
focus, including issues related to accessing health care services (du Plessis et ah, 2001, 
2002) . .
1.4.1 The Importance of Studying Rural Health Care Ethics
There are four primary reasons why the study of rural health ethics is of importance. 
The first concerns the significant number of people who continue to live in rural 
communities. According to our definition this represents approximately 22% of the 
population or 6.2 million Canadians (du Plessis et ah, 2001,2002). The second 
consideration concerns the often-distinct characteristics of rural communities. These 
include but are not limited to a higher concentration of low-income earners, higher 
poverty rates, increased rates of mental health issues, and increased involvement in risky 
sexual behaviour resulting in higher rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted
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infections (STIs) (CIHI, 2006; Dryburgh, 2000; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; Romanow, 
2002; Pong, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). Third, there 
exist fewer health care providers and institutions per capita, than in urban areas, 
engendering shortages and longer wait times (Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton, ■ : 
2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). Finally, ethical issues such as: ‘safeguarding 
confidentiality’, ‘boundary conflicts due to overlapping relations’, ‘access to health care 
services’, ‘allocation of health care resources’, ‘reluctance to seek a diagnosis due to 
stigma’, and ‘community cultural value conflicts’ can each become serious problems and 
are often neglected in discussions concerning general ethical issues (Nelson, 2004;
Nelson & Schmidek, 2008). For these reasons, research that incorporates a rural lens or 
that comments on the rural context is important and needed.
1.5 Methods
Traditionally ethics and morality are studied in a philosophical context with a focus 
on normative as opposed to descriptive knowledge claims (Kagan, 1998). Therefore, in 
contrast to descriptive ethics (a subset of non-normative ethics) which uses empirical 
methods to investigate how people reason through and react to particular moral situations 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009), normative ethics “involves substantive proposals 
concerning how [one should] act, how [one should] live, or what kind of person [one 
should be]. In particular, it attempts to state and defend the most basic principles 
governing these matters” (Kagan, 1998, p. 2). Normative analysis thus seeks to describe 
what ought to be the case or what ethical norms should guide ethical conduct 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Kagan, 1998). < , - , .
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j ; Although both normative and non-normative approaches to understanding morality 
are important and useful, one’s guiding questions as well as one’s purpose for asking 
these questions will differ depending on the approach assumed (Kagan, 1998). For 
example, if  we wish to understand how moral norms guide professional practice in health 
care or how individuals go about confronting difficult moral dilemmas on a daily basis, a 
descriptive approach is best (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). Curlin, Lawrence, Chin & 
Lantos (2007) effectively used this method when inquiring how physicians interpret their 
ethical rights and obligations when conflicts of conscience arise within clinical practice.
In contrast to descriptive approaches, normative approaches are best suited to 
situations where one seeks to “state and defend substantive moral claims” (Kagan, 1998, 
p. 8). Within the category of normative ethics, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) also add 
applied ethics. The focus of applied ethics is the application of normative moral 
principles, theories, and precedents to specific complex cases and contexts (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 2009; Kagan, 1998). This approach is useful in outlining injustices as well 
as drawing attention to inconsistencies between how people, organizations, and societies 
currently act and how they should act (ethically speaking) (e.g., simply because an action 
is legal does not mean it is ethical and vice versa). Because the purpose of my thesis is to 
analyze a relatively specific issue as well as to offer moral judgment and prescriptions 
related to it, my thesis can most accurately be described as normative and localized more 
specifically within the realm of applied ethics.
In assuming this approach I undertake a process of reasoned ethical analysis, 
informed by various normative ethical constructs such as those related to justice, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and autonomy. In so doing, relevant arguments are
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presented and the important task of determining which side presents the stronger case is 
outlined (Kagan, 1998). Through this process one constructs an ethical analysis that is 
expected to be both compelling and based on solid moral reasoning and justification.
1.6 Restatement of Purpose & Proposal of Research Questions
With 51 hospitals currently operating in eight provinces across the country (the 
Province of Newfoundland does not currently have Catholic hospitals only one long term 
care facility) (see Appendix A.), Catholic hospitals remain important players in the 
Canadian health care system. Despite their significant involvement in providing health 
care however, little attention has focused on the legitimacy of Catholic hospitals to 
conscientiously refuse to provide services that contradict their guiding religious beliefs. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ethical implications of Catholic hospital 
conscientious objections to provide reproductive services to which they are morally 
opposed within the context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically 
within rural areas. Moving forward the following two questions will assume the focus of 
the analysis.
1) Do hospitals possess a conscience according to the dominant view of conscience 
in bioethics? *
2) Should Catholic hospitals be permitted to refuse to provide reproductive services 
to which they are morally opposed within the context of the Canadian health care 
system and in particular, within rural areas?
18
conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals in Canada, spark dialogue and debate, and 
finally, to inform and influence future health policy decisions.
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Chapter 2. Conscience: Do Hospitals Qualify?
2.1 Introduction
The importance of establishing a firm understanding of conscience lies in determining 
whether those who claim objections based on conscience use the term appropriately. 
Although there is a general consensus that individual human beings can claim to have a 
conscience (Benjamin, 1995), whether institutions and therefore hospitals can reasonably 
claim to possess a conscience, remains contested.
According to Cook and Dickens (1999), “Conscience is a right of individuals, but not 
of institutions such as hospitals and clinics” (p.85). They argue thatT’while corporations 
may benefit from a ‘legal personality’ in the context of various National and International 
laws, they are granted this status for purely pragmatic reasons (e.g., to allow 
organizations to sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and conduct business as a single 
entity) and therefore, unlike humans, do not possess a conscience. Given these 
limitations, hospitals they argue, are thereby precluded from enjoying the same 
entitlements (e.g., freedom of conscience) as ‘natural persons’ (humans) under 
international human rights legislation (Dickens & Cook, 2000). This position is also 
supported by Canadian Constitutional law, under which “corporations do not enjoy or 
exercise freedom of religion or conscience and, therefore, cannot claim an infringement 
of their own rights. Freedom of religion or conscience is a freedom that only individuals 
possess” (Wynn, Erdman, Foster & Trussell, 2007, p.258).
In contrast to these primarily legal points of view, authors such as Sulmasy (2008), 
De George (1982), and Gallagher and Goodstein (2002), argue that hospitals do in fact
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have a legitimate claim to conscience, which is largely afforded to them via their 
established structures and processes. Although the possession o f a conscience does not
■ ' r
automatically engender a right or entitlement to make objections based upon it, it is the 
base standard, or first requirement for it. As such, the question of whether institutions, 
and thereby hospitals, possess a conscience is an important stepping stone in exploring 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a Catholic hospital’s claim to conscientious refusal.
There are a number of ways in which to understand conscience. The prevailing view 
within bioethics, titled the “dominant view” by McLeod (forthcoming), is that conscience 
works to preserve or promote integrity, and does so by influencing agents to act in line 
with their moral values. The purpose of this chapter is to determine-whether the dominant 
view of conscience allows us to say that hospitals have a conscience. Assuming the 
‘Dominant View’ is correct, I will argue that hospitals, as institutions, cannot possess a 
conscience because they fail to fulfill a number of the necessary criteria for it.
To pursue my objective, the first section of the chapter begins with a brief 
introduction to the notion of conscience, followed by .a description of the dominant view, 
and a proposal of the criteria necessary for an entity to qualify as possessing a conscience 
on,this view. In the second section, using the developed criteria as a framework for 
analysis, I will discuss reasons why hospitals might satisfy the requirements for 
conscience as well as reasons why they might not. Ultimately, I will conclude the 
dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals have a conscience.
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2.2 Conscience
2.2.1 A Brief Introduction to Conscience
■ Originating in the discipline of Christian moral theology (Benjamin, 1995; Hardt, 
2008), the concept of conscience remains a fixture in contemporary academic and social 
discourse. Reference to it can be observed throughout various works, from the insightful 
teachings of Mahatma Gandhi (Rattan, 1991) to the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (United Nations, 1948, Articles 1 & 18). So engrained is the concept within the 
moral fabric of contemporary North-American and European societies that it has even 
been modeled into cartoon form, as portrayed by the lovable character Jiminy Cricket in 
Disney’s 1940 rendition of Pinocchio. ■
The concept of conscience has also received growing attention in the field of 
medicine and bioethics, as conscience is relevant to the task of morally complex decision­
making within our increasingly pluralistic society. Presumably, as science continues to 
push the boundaries of medicine, and the complexity of health care decisions grow, so 
too will the number of conflicts of conscience and conscientious refusals. Despite the 
established presence of conscience within society, however, scholars throughout history . 
have often disagreed about its nature and have presented varied and, at times, 
contradictory descriptions of the concept (Benjamin, 1995; Lawrence & Curlin, 2007; 
McGee, 2007). The existence of such opposing understandings is brought to bear in the 
following passage by Bernard Wand (1961).
It has been said of conscience that it is fallible (Broad), that it is infallible 
(Butler); that its ultimate basis is emotional (Mill), that its ultimate source is 
rational (Rashdall); that it is the voice of God (Hartman), or the voice of custom 
(Paulsen); that it is merely advisory (Nowell-Smith), that it is unconscious
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(Freud); that it is [a] faculty (Butler), that it is not (any contemporary moral 
philosopher); that it is disposition to have certain beliefs, emotions, and conations 
which, when operative issue in conscientious actions (Broad), and that it is 
conscientious action (Ryle) (p.771).
Although the debate continues, agreeing upon a definition of conscience is an essential 
step in establishing the fundamental requirements for it. In other words, we must gamer a 
solid understanding of conscience before we can determine what would qualify an entity 
for it. ‘ ■ ' ■ .
2.2.2 Gonscience: The Dominant View
Despite the lack of consensus about how to understand conscience both within and 
across many disciplines (e.g., philosophy, theology), there is some consensus on the 
matter within bioethics. The relevant view of conscience, aptly named the dominant view 
by McLeod (forthcoming), proposes that conscience is best interpreted as a mode of 
reflective consciousness, wherein one’s actions, or projected actions, are assessed for 
their consistency with one’s moral values and standards. Conscience, as such, works to 
promote and maintain moral unity - understood as integrity - by compelling individuals to 
reliably act and conduct themselves in agreement with their moral values. The main 
advocates of this view are Martin Benjamin (1995), Jeffrey Blustein (1993), James 
Childress (1979, 1997), and Mark Wicclair (2000, 2006, 2007) (as cited in McLeod, 
forthcoming). (Hereafter, “conscience” will refer to the term as understood on the 
dominant view.) - : .
2.2.2.1 Criteria For Conscience
In the following section I will describe the five criteria an entity would need to fulfill 
in order to qualify as possessing a conscience. To accomplish this objective, I first need
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to develop the criteria, because a previously established list does not exist. Together these 
criteria should serve as a reliable template for analyzing an entity’s claim to conscience.
In addition, each of the criteria is individually necessary and together they are jointly :
sufficient for something to have a conscience.
i) The entity must be a reasonable candidate for moral agency.
ii) The entity must possess a set of values, which jointly contribute to the formation
- of its identity and self-concept.
iii) The entity must possess cognitive agency. By “cognitive agency,” I mean the
entity must be able to evaluate its actions, intentions, and desires regarding a 
situation based on its established set of values. Stated differently, the entity 
must be able to preserve or promote its inner moral unity by engaging in a 
relevant form of moral reasoning.
iv) The entity must have enough affective agency so that it can appropriately
experience guilt and shame. ..........................
v) The entity must ultimately be subject to internal sanctioning, whereby feelings of
shame and guilt are self imposed and internally mediated.
2.2.2.1.1 Criterion One -  Candidacy for Moral Agency
The first requirement for conscience is that the entity in question must be a reasonable 
candidate for moral agency. To be a moral agent entails that one possesses the ability to 
identify, understand, and comply with relevant and applicable moral standards ^
(Eshleman, 2009; Himma, 2008). We assign moral blame to agents who fail to uphold 
their moral obligations, because by virtue of their status as moral agents, they are
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- responsible for ensuring that their actions and inactions conform to those obligations. 
Because conscience is a moral quality, it encourages people to behave in accordance not 
with their mere preferences, but with their moral values (Blustein, 1993; Childress, 1979; 
Wicclair, 2000). To have a conscience is to possess at least some level of moral agency, 
because it is the role of conscience to help keep us, and our actions, accountable to our 
own moral standards, as well as to alert us when we are at risk of violating them. 
Therefore, to have a conscience is at the very least to be among the group that could 
conceivably qualify as moral agents.
This first criterion for conscience also encompasses the rest, in that the remaining 
criteria are all elements of moral agency. Being the sort of moral agent then who 
possesses these further qualities is sufficient for having a conscience.
2.2.2.1.2 Criterion Tw o- Value Framework r ;
A second important requirement for conscience is that the entity in question possesses
a set o f values, which jointly contribute to the formation of its moral identity and moral
„ ' ' ' . . . ' ■ \ .
self-concept. These commitments are especially important as they form the moral 
framework or ‘master list’ of moral values, rules, and standards to which conscience 
refers. According to the dominant view, an agent’s integrity, or moral unity, depends 
upon their adherence to their espoused moral framework. Failure to uphold these moral 
commitments erodes their moral identity and causes emotional distress (McLeod, 
forthcoming). Heeding conscience preserves or promotes inner unity while transgressing 
the verdicts of conscience results in the imposition of negative sanctions and the
- experience of moral fracture. (These last points are further discussed under criteria four 
and five.)
2.2.2.1.3 Criterion Three - Cognitive Agency
Thirdly, conscience includes a cognitive or evaluative component. This element is 
essential to the function of conscience; it permits the contextual application and 
interpretation of the agent’s moral values, rules, and standards. In other words, having a 
conscience requires not only a set of values but also being able to examine these values 
and determine their weight, significance, and relevance to the situation in question. 
Therefore, while an individual may strongly value respect for human life in all its shapes 
and forms, when faced with a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment to a patient 
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), he/she may freely reconcile with a decision to do 
so, knowing that it would eventuate in the patient’s death, on the grounds that he/she also 
values respecting expressed patient wishes, and that continuing treatment would 
compromise the patient’s basic human dignity by prolonging unnecessary pain and 
suffering. As this example shows, when evaluating a situation, individuals must often 
take into consideration multiple values (in our case three: respect for human life, for 
autonomy, and for human dignity) and in turn decide on a course of action based on their 
assessment of each value’s relevance and importance given the circumstance(s). 
Conversely, to maintain self-harmony and unity, individuals must also evaluate their 
actions, anticipated actions, and intentions regarding a situation based upon their 
understanding of what these values require of them. . ■
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The evaluative component of conscience also signifies that while one’s moral 
commitments play a crucial role in informing conscience, they themselves do not equal 
conscience (Childress, 1979). Childress (1979) makes this distinction, stating: “Although 
a person’s appeal to his conscience usually involves an appeal to moral standards, 
conscience is not itself the standard. It is the mode o f consciousness resulting from the 
application of standards to his conduct” (p.319). Conscience works to promote and 
maintain integrity by evaluating a situation based on whether it fits with one’s moral 
values, and informing the individual whether he/she will feel guilt or shame as a result. In 
so doing, conscience operates both prospectively and retrospectively: promoting integrity 
by highlighting past wrongs and warning of future disharmony, should contemplated 
wrongs be committed (Benjamin, 1995; Childress, 1979, 1997). _
2.2.2.1.4 Criterion Four - Affective Agency
The fourth requirement for conscience is affective or emotional. As Childress (1979)
notes, conscience functions as an inner moral sanction, the ultimate and final arbiter,
■ ' ■ . \ ■ 
whose negative verdicts - imposed through feelings of guilt, shame and self-betrayal - are
accompanied by the aching consciousness of a fundamental loss of integrity. Whereas a
good conscience - often described by terms such as: ‘clean’, ‘whole’, ‘quiet’, and
‘integrated’ (Childress, 1979, 1997) - sits quietly on its own, pure as a lamb and
uninterrupted in its thoughts, a bad conscience makes its presence distinctly known,
rearing its ugly head with no apparent escape from the negative sanctions it wishes to
impose. Proponents of the dominant view postulate that conscience mediates behaviour
by threatening individuals with unpleasant emotions that they would much rather avoid.
Because conscience works to promote positive behaviour through the threat of negative
sanctions, it is logical that an entity moved by conscience must first possess the capacity 
to experience the negative emotions (guilt and shame) with which it is threatened. An 
entity must therefore have enough affective agency to feel and experience the emotions 
of moral guilt and shame: the emotions that conscience uses to ensure agents remain 
accountable to their own moral standards. : -
2.2.2.1.5 Criterion Five - Internal Sanctioning
In addition to its affective component, conscience on the dominant view requires that 
the entity in question be subject to internal sanctioning. The judgments of conscience 
come from within and reflect one’s own assessment of right and wrong as opposed to 
external judgments or sanctions imposed by others. As noted above, the threat that 
conscience poses is a loss of integrity: being kept in proper balance with oneself and not 
necessarily with others or with popular society. To prohibit an agent from following the 
dictates of her conscience would be to force her to commit a form of self-betrayal and 
submit to the negative sanctions of her conscience (Wicclair, 2000, 2006, 2007). In short, 
the capacity not only to feel guilt and shame, but also to actively ‘punish’ oneself with 
these feelings as a result o f misguided thoughts or actions is a necessary part of 
possessing a conscience.
2.2.2.2 Support For the Dominant View
McLeod (forthcoming) gives a number of reasons for thinking that the dominant view 
is correct. Among the most compelling arguments is that the:dramatic language often 
used by conscientious objectors reinforces the threatening nature of conscience, while 
underscoring its commitment to preserving inner moral unity. Examples of such appeals
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include: “I must protect my sense of m yself’; “I wouldn’t be able to live with myself if I 
did [X]”; “I wouldn’t be able to look myself in the mirror/sleep at night”; “I could no 
longer think of myself as a Jehovah’s Witness [Catholic, Jew, moral person etc...] if I 
were to do or assist in [Y]” (Childress, 1997,2006; Benjamin, 1995). Furthermore, as 
McLeod (forthcoming) notes, the dominant view coheres well with three other broadly 
popular aspects of conscience: namely that a conscience is uneasy when it is guilty -  
fitting with the dominant view’s portrayal of conscience as causing distress in the face of 
moral discord (Childress, 1979, 2006); that its jurisdiction to impose sanctions is strictly 
personal (i.e., its verdicts are limited to our own actions or inactions and not the actions 
or inactions of others) - suggesting a concern for the self and protection of one’s own 
integrity vs. a general concern for what is right (Benjamin, 1995; Blustein, 1993; Ryle, 
1940); and that it respects the distinction between making a moral judgment (e.g., X is 
morally wrong) and making an appeal to conscience (e.g., X is morally wrong and there 
is an added wrongness for me to participate in X because it would compromise my 
integrity) (Blustein, 1993).
Thus, the dominant view has compelling aspects to it. To sum up the view itself: 
conscience is a mode of reflective consciousness which influences one to act, either 
prospectively or retrospectively, in accordance with one’s moral values in order to 
promote and maintain individual moral integrity. Failing to abide by one’s conscience 
causes distress in the form of guilt and shame (negative sanctions), and leads to fractures 
within the self. Using this definition, I established five criteria for having a conscience: 1) 
being a reasonable candidate for moral agency; 2) possessing a set of values which help
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. to define the self; 3) possessing cognitive agency; 4) possessing affective agency; and 5) 
being capable of internal sanctioning.
The dominant view is not immune to criticism (see McLeod, forthcoming). 
Nevertheless, it is dominant in bioethics, and more importantly, it is compelling in many 
ways. Thusj it is worth discerning whether the view would allow for institutional 
conscience. In the next section, I use the criteria I have developed as a framework for 
analyzing whether hospitals have a legitimate claim to conscience.
2.3 Assessing The Hospital’s Claim To Conscience
While discussing in this section whether hospitals are reasonable candidates for 
having a conscience, I will examine reasons that various authors offer for why hospitals 
do possess a conscience. I will also ultimately argue that such a view about hospitals is 
incorrect. ■
2.3.1 Criterion One -  Candidacy for Moral Agency
The literature on moral agency identifies two different kinds of agents: 1) individual 
agents and 2) collective agents. To quote from this literature:
. While the notion of moral responsibility, traditionally understood, grounds moral 
blameworthiness in the will of discrete individuals who freely cause harm, the 
notion of collective responsibility associates both causation and blameworthiness 
with groups and construes groups as moral agents in their own right (Smiley,
2011, p.2).
Conceptualized as such, groups are alleged, for all intents and purposes, to possess the 
ability to formulate intentions and to act as a unified entity with similar rights, privileges, 
and demands afforded to and imposed upon them as on individual moral agents (Smiley, 
2011). To function as a collective agent is to act not as a mere aggregate of individuals,
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. but as a non-distributive entity that “transcends the contributions of particular group 
members” (Smiley, 2011, p. 4).
An ideal example of such an agent is that of the Borg, a fictional pseudo-race of 
‘cybernetic organisms’ (beings with both biological and artificial parts) featured in the 
series Star Trek. Unaware of being made up of discrete individuals, the Borg form an 
integrated collective of drones who operate with a shared consciousness, or a ‘hive 
mind” which allows them to think and act as one (“Borg”, n.d.). Thus, it is impossible to 
refer to the encounters, actions, and deliberations of one drone without referring, to those 
of the entire collective and vice versa. : \
As I have said, the Borg represents the ‘ideal’ (collective agentjfm practice it is not 
necessary for a group to achieve such a pervasive level of integration in order to qualify 
as a collective agent. What is necessary, however, is that agents move away from 
thinking and acting only as discrete individuals and move towards defining their 
thoughts, actions, failures and accomplishments, intentions, and subsequent identity as 
one with the collective. Accordingly, proponents of collective responsibility advocate that
i ■ ' . ’ •
groups, through their own established structures and processes, can bring about actions 
not possible of individuals alone (Cooper, 1968; French, 1998; May, 1987; as cited in 
Smiley, 2011). As Buchholz and Rosenthal (referring to Werhane 1985) suggest:
In a collective action each individual action is mixed with others and transformed 
into an action or policy of the organization. Because of this process of 
transformation, the collective action of the corporation is quite different from the 
primary inputs of any of the individual contributors (Buchholz & Rosenthal,
2006, p.238).
Proponents also highlight that as a society, we are often quick to assign generalized 
blame to groups, corporations, and organizations, which presupposes that some level of
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collective responsibility/agency exists (Cooper, 1968; Tollefsen, 2006; as cited in Smiley,
2011).
Those who favor a hospital’s claim to conscience (Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002; 
Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008; Wildes, 1997) often speak of the organization as a 
collective moral agent, whose integrity reflects the actions and deliberations it 
undertakes. In this way, authors attempt, albeit in different ways, to characterize hospitals 
as legitimate moral agents who, in their own right, possess a collective conscience. While 
there is still debate regarding whether institutions, such as hospitals, often operate or truly 
qualify as collective agents (Smiley, 2011),9 it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper 
that they find themselves among those that are plausible candidatesL_fpr moral agency. 
Recall that the first criterion for conscience developed above was that the entity be a 
candidate for moral agency. We can therefore accept, at least for the time being, that 
hospitals satisfy this criterion, not because they count as individual moral agents^ but 
because they could easily count as collective moral agents. ^
2.3.2 Criterion Two -  Value Framework
Moving forward, in order to successfully fulfill the second criterion for conscience, 
an entity must possess an established set of values, which in turn contribute to the
9 Those who raise concerns about the legitimacy o f collective responsibility highlight a number o f  
controversies, two o f  which include: 1) whether groups/organizations can form intentions and act upon 
these intentions; 2) whether groups/organizations, as distinct from group/organization members, can be 
morally blameworthy (Smiley, 2011). For a more in depth look at the controversy and an overview o f the 
current debate, see Smiley (2011).
formation of its identity and self-concept. To satisfy this condition, advocates of the idea 
that hospitals can have a conscience are often quick to draw similarities between hospital 
mission statements and their more personal counterpart, individual value frameworks 
(Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008; Wildes, 1997).
Mission statements are primarily defined as management tools that serve to internally 
motivate staff while concurrently establishing the direction, objectives, and ideology of 
an organization. At their fullest, they are formal documents that outline an institution’s 
purpose, vision, and values, and are subsequently meant to guide decision-making and 
resource allocation (Bart, 2007; Bart & Hupfer, 2004; Forbes & Seena, 2006).
Understood as such, mission statements, like personal value frameworks, can provide 
hospitals and those working within them, with an ontology, or paradigm of sorts, for 
understanding how the organization views the world and how health care should be 
delivered. In this way, as argued by Sulmasy (2008) and Wildes (1997), established 
guidelines provide a framework of values upon which individuals can draw and similar to 
personal value commitments, help to inform conscience and guide decision-making 
across the organization. Some say, that in addition to their role as general value 
frameworks, mission statements are both a source and an expression of the hospital’s 
shared values, commitments, and culture (Bart, 2007), and thereby serve as a mechanism 
through which it can manifest a distinct moral identity (Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008; 
Wildes, 1997). *
Integrated into the mission statements of Catholic hospitals are the established 
principles and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church (Bart, 2007; CHAC, 2000; 
O’Rourke, 2001). The values that inform these statements contribute to a moral identity
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founded at least partly in the teachings of Jesus Christ. A religious institution’s identity is 
often strongly linked to its mission (O’Rourke, 2001; Smith litis, 2001; Stempsey, 2001; 
Wildes, 1997),10 which according to Pellegrino (2002) provides it with a strong claim to 
having a conscience. - ■ - .
The analogy between personal value frameworks and mission statements is quite 
strong. Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be suspicious of whether, despite having 
mission statements, some health care institutions satisfy the second criterion for 
conscience.
The first concern relates to the potentially vague nature of mission statements as 
explicit value frameworks. Because these statements are generally designed for high 
level, overarching guidance, they often sacrifice specificity in exchange for broader, more 
generalized themes of guidance. Teasing out more than a few specific values might not 
always be possible, thereby requiring professionals to simultaneously consult and apply 
their own, or alternate, values to a situation. This process is further complicated by the 
nature o f mission statements as unranked decision guidelines, making not merely 
cognition (criterion three) but the addition of further values, such as those that help rank 
competing principles, necessary in cases of conflict.
10 Note this does not preclude secular hospitals from forging a strong identity relationship with their own 
mission statements. Nor does it mean that to have a strong identity a hospital’s values must be religiously 
based. The link between mission statements, identity, and integrity simply seems to be more emphasized in 
the literature regarding the identity o f Catholic hospitals.
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Consider for example the established organizational values of St. Joseph’s Health . 
Care, London (London, Ontario, Canada): respect, excellence, and compassion (St. 
Joseph’s Health Care, London, 2010); or those of St. Michael’s Hospital (Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada): Human dignity, excellence, compassion, social responsibility, 
community of service, and pride of achievement (St. Michael’s Hospital, 2011). As value 
statements they are certainly representative of what the organization wishes to achieve as 
a whole, but as tangible and applicable values, they are vague and still require a great 
deal of situational manipulation and interpretation. Although under Criterion two, we are 
concerned with the simple existence of an established set of values, the factor of 
ambiguity is important to note, as it will return to play a decisive role in the analysis of 
later criteria. . .
The second important point of contention lies in the potential for collective ownership 
of the institutional mission statement. As an administrative tool, common buy-in across 
various levels and sectors of the organization is essential for collective application 
(Wildes, 1997). If a mission statement is not completely representative of the culture, or 
is poorly developed -  for example if it is developed too quickly or without sufficient staff 
consultation -  its legitimacy and authority, as an overarching value framework and 
identity-conferring tool, will be weak. This point too will return in our discussion of the 
remaining criteria for conscience.
Despite these concerns, mission statements, if they are well developed, can work to 
establish a sufficiently recognizable set of institutional values, which in turn can 
contribute to the formation of the hospital’s identity and self-concept. Thus, while having 
some reservations about whether some health care facilities satisfy the second criterion is
. appropriate, hospitals whose mission statements genuinely define their identity can fulfill 
both parts (set of values, moral identity) of this criterion.
2.3.3 Criterion Three -  Cognitive Agency
The next and third important element is the ability for an entity to engage in moral 
reasoning. This ability is what permits the contextual application and interpretation of 
one’s value framework. Possessing a conscience is not only about adopting a set of 
values as one’s own, but also about evaluating (either consciously, or subconsciously via 
intuition or perception) one’s actions, or anticipated actions and desires regarding a 
situation, based upon these values.
A number of authors assume or argue that hospitals exercise cognitive agency. For 
example, Sulmasy (2008) claims that, :
The conscience of an institution is rooted in the fact that it professes a set of 
fundamental moral commitments... and is exercised in making the moral 
judgment that a decision that it has made or is considering would violate 1 
those...commitments (p. 143).
The assumption here is that hospitals possess the cognitive agency necessary for having a 
conscience and that the individuals, who work for it, will judge whether or not the 
hospital has lived up to its values and moral expectations.
Hospitals have this ability, according to Gallagher and Goodstein (2002), because of 
what these commentators call “mission discernment”: “...a core organizational process 
that allows health care institutions to actively reflect on their mission and core values and 
confront the ethical challenges posed by the contemporary health care context” (p.435).
In this way, actors within the hospital, such as members of governing Boards,
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committees, policy councils, and ethics teams, make decisions based on the hospital’s 
moral values and commitments by reasoning together as a collective agent. According to 
advocates of institutional conscience, these groups and bodies, especially at the Board 
and governance levels, can engage in collective moral cognition and reasoning, thereby 
achieving a collective mental state representative of the hospital (Gallagher & Goodstein, 
2002; Sulmasy, 2008). ,
But in many ways; it remains problematic to attribute cognitive agency -  collective or 
otherwise -  to hospitals or institutions. As Sulmasy (2008) and Gallagher and Goodstein 
(2002) would have us believe, hospitals do in fact possess the ability to apply their 
established organizational values to particular contexts. They do soon the manner of a 
collective agent, wherein employees from the boardroom to the bedside, work 
collectively, advancing and applying the values o f the organization to everyday problems 
and situations. But are we really speaking of a truly collective conscience that can 
respond to situations in light of the organization’s values, in a consistent and morally 
unified way, or are we more accurately referring to a number of agents, who individually, 
through the efforts of their own conscience, work to interpret and apply the established 
values of the hospital? In the following paragraphs I will argue that hospital employees 
do not function as a collective cognitive agent, but instead, as individual agents, who 
themselves engage in cognitive reasoning and reflection on behalf of the hospital in 
unique, introspective, and personally inspired ways. To do so, I will first examine the 
interpretation and application of hospital values at the level of the individual health care 
professional (HCP)/employee and second, at the Board level.
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2.3.3.1 The Individual HCP or Employee Level
In a multicultural society, the content of people’s consciences will vary considerably 
depending on their personal, professional, and social roles or values. Moreover, research 
suggests that among complex organizations, especially those divided along clear 
occupational lines, such as hospitals, various subcultures will emerge (Scott, Mannion, 
Davies, & Marshall, 2003). Although individuals within these co-existing subcultures are 
linked by a common thread - i.e., the delivery of health care services within an 
organization - Scott et al. (2003) indicate that each person’s professional affiliation 
(whether they are administrators, doctors, nurses, therapists, clerks, porters, or cleaners), 
as well as their gender, ethnicity, social class, religion, and even sub-specialty, can create 
a distinctive sense of identity and purpose. ^
Health care is a value-laden enterprise. Accordingly, there are calls for professionals 
at all levels of the hospital to behave not as ‘automatons’, or ‘technical clerks’ (Wicclair, 
2006), but as conscientious and knowledgeable stewards of their profession and affiliated 
organization. To ask less of these people would be to compromise their personal as well 
as their professional integrity. As hospitals grow in diversity and complexity, the mixing 
of personal, professional, and organizational values will invariably create differences in 
moral interpretation across the organization. While the values of the hospital may remain 
those of the organization as a whole, their centrality to the everyday workings of 
individual conscience will depend upon their positioning as ‘deep moral commitments’ -  
those values most central to one’s core moral identity -  as well as the significance 
individuals see them having to particular situations.
While governance Boards grapple with joint decision-making, we might, for the time 
being, consider their efforts as channeling those of a collective moral agent, whose 
deliberations reflect a shared collective conscience. As we expand from the core 
governance of the organization however, the same does not necessarily hold true. The 
capacity for Boards to reason together is largely predicated on their shared understanding 
of the established core values of the hospital and their expected commitment to keep 
them at the forefront of the decision-making process. Once we start moving away from 
the core of the organization, however, we gradually depart from the absolute centrality of 
these established values to the moral reasoning that informs conscience.
Just as a circular ripple of water emanating from a central pointrof impact gradually 
dissipates and looses force the further it travels from the core, so too might the 
established values of the hospital. Although we recognize the broader ripples as 
belonging to the initial point of impact within an otherwise calm lake, as the ripples grow 
in diameter, they become more removed from this point and are less influenced by it.
Similarly, as we expand from the core governance structure of the organization, it 
becomes less likely that the values of the hospital will maintain the same strength or force 
as they do at the Board level. It is more likely, as we move from governance to bedside, 
that individuals will include and incorporate personal and professional values (i.e., those
values strongly influenced by subculture, previous life experience etc...) into their daily
- ■ . . ■ " *
understanding and judgments of conscience. This trend will appear regardless of whether 
the hospital has a religious affiliation.
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Consider the results of a recent study comparing the content and mission-related 
performance of Canadian hospitals (Bart, 2007): » \
While the faith-based institutions in this study appear to excel in gamering 
significantly higher levels of emotional conviction to their missions, they fail to 
capture the same degree of advantage over their secular counterparts when it 
comes to keeping the mission ‘front and centre’ as a decision making tool (p.688).
In other words, , while members of Catholic hospitals tended to express a greater 
emotional commitment to the hospital’s mission, these hospitals struggled just as much as 
secular ones in having mission statements guide ‘day-to-day decision-making’ (Bart, 
2007). While individuals working within the hospital, by virtue of agreeing to work there, 
will likely have adopted and integrated the values of the hospital into their own value 
systems to some degree, for many these values will not be core values -  those most 
central to the deliberations of conscience - as opposed to perimeter or peripheral values, 
which are still important to the moral decision-making process but successively less so 
than values at the core (See 
Figure 1).
I use the terms perimeter 
and peripheral here to illustrate 
incremental differences ; 
between those values closer to 
our core and those further 
away. Furthermore, given




organizations and the desperate need for health care providers across the country, even if 
one argued that to work at a hospital an employee’s core values should align with those 
of the organization, it is unlikely the values o f all staff would precisely mirror those of 
their employer. Moreover, even if  one’s core values did accurately align with those of the 
hospital, it is further unlikely, considering differences in individuals’ perimeter and 
peripheral values, that each verdict of conscience across an organization would be the 
same.
To elaborate, in as much as organizational values may inspire an understanding of 
oneself as a hospital employee, each person will bring with them their own values and 
experiences, which, to varying degrees, must be balanced with those-of the hospital. This 
is not to say organizational values are unimportant to the everyday deliberations of staff. 
Simply put, while we may work for an organization, and even agree with many of its 
values, at the end of the day, the values that will remain at the forefront of our decision­
making process will be those most central to our own integrity and self-concept. Given 
the diversity of core values that exist, as individuals integrate the values of the hospital 
into their practice, they will inevitably do so in different ways and to different extents. It 
is therefore not surprising, that individuals throughout an organization will interpret and 
apply organizational values differently, thus leading to variations in deliberations and 
judgments of conscience across the hospital.
As I ’ve said, however, there may also be cases where the core values of a hospital and 
of an employee align. Indeed an individual may have opted to join a particular 
organization because of its espoused values, or after having worked there for a period of 
time, find that their values have become those of the organization. Unfortunately though,
even the alignment of core values does not ensure that verdicts of conscience will be the 
same. To illustrate my. point, consider once again the core values of St. Joseph’s Health 
Care, London -  Respect, Excellence, and Compassion (St. Joseph’s Health Care, London, 
2010) -  viewed this time in the context of an ethical dilemma where two hypothetical 
staff are asked to administer increasing amounts of morphine to a dying patient. For the 
sake of argument, I will assume that the core values of both staff members align with 
those of the hospital, but that the staff members differ in their perimeter and peripheral 
values. Thus, both value respect, excellence, and compassion, but at the same time, one 
sees the administration of potentially lethal amounts of morphine as being permissible 
and the other does not. Looking more closely, the first staff member sees the high doses 
of morphine as respecting the patient’s dignity by easing his pain and suffering. Although 
she understands it may hasten death by suppressing the respiratory system, the intention 
of administering the morphine is to ensure the patient’s comfort. In administering the 
medication, the first staff member - informed by perimeter and peripheral values about 
beneficence (e.g., the reduction of pain and suffering) and the preservation of dignity 
during this difficult time - believes she is acting in the best interests of the patient and 
thus providing excellent and compassionate care. Conversely, our second staff member 
interprets the administration of these high doses o f morphine as potentially compromising 
the sanctity of life and violating the principle of non-maleficence. In this case, despite the 
fact that the morphine will ease some of the patient’s pain, it will also have the 
unacceptable effect of hastening his death. Therefore, for the second staff member, the 
proposed actions - informed by perimeter and peripheral standards about non-maleficence
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- and the sanctity of life - are not in line with the respectful and compassionate delivery of 
care. .
In the previous example both staff members are convinced they are accurately 
promoting the core values of the hospital. However, as a result of their conscience, each 
is compelled to follow an opposite path. This scenario reinforces how the deliberations 
and verdicts of conscience can be unique, despite individuals possessing the same core 
values. Core values can also come to mean different things when informed by different 
perimeter and peripheral values. Once again we are reminded of the diversity of 
conscience within organizations, and this time how a person’s perimeter and peripheral 
values can play into it. • __-­
In this way, although Sulmasy (2008) and Gallagher and Goodstein (2002) argue that 
the shared understanding of a hospital’s governance Board permit it to reflect on 
situations in the manner of a collective agent, the truth is that these people represent only 
a small number of those operating within the organization. As we expand to encapsulate 
the efforts of the broader organizational community, we see that a greater proportion of 
people within it are not working as a collective reflective agent, but rather as individual 
agents working to preserve or promote inner unity, or unity between their values and 
those of the hospital in unique ways.
2.3.3.2 The Board Level
s Having explored the interpretation and application of hospital values at the individual 
HCP/employee level, I now turn to the Board level. Here, I question whether it is enough 
to say that because Board members have a common understanding of the organization’s
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values, and together reach common decisions, that their deliberations afford them, and 
thereby the hospital, the one mindedness necessary for a collective conscience. In as 
much as Board members, adhering to the same core values, might arrive at a collective 
decision, the reasons why each individual agreed to the decision can be strikingly 
different. In other words, when we look more closely, our ripple analogy seems to fall 
apart; even at the Board level, the core of the organization, the epicenter of the ripple, 
things are not completely unified.
As an example, let us examine a Board deliberating about dishonesty. Let us also say 
that during this deliberation, the unequivocal answer from all members was that lying is 
wrong. Indeed the final answer to any question is important, but what might be even 
more telling when examining conscience is the deeper reasoning behind its verdicts.
Returning to our example, let us probe further into the reasons why Board members 
might decide that lying is wrong:
1) God says so,
2) It violates a categorical moral imperative,
3) Deception contradicts the values of the medical profession,
4) It produces undesirable consequences
Although the example is relatively simple, it makes a clear point. Each of these 
justifications produces the same result - dishonesty is wrong - but the justifications differ. 
The decision-makers arrive at a collective verdict, but not for the same reasons. The
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reasoning that informs conscience differs from one person to the next. There is no 
collective cognitive agency.
By concentrating on the final answer to a question, we neglect important information 
that hides beneath the surface. When small, seemingly insignificant details about the 
question change, a previously established consensus could fall apart. This is especially 
true in health care, where the weighing and balancing of values is a frequent, exceedingly 
complex, and an ever-evolving process. Looking once again at our example, what answer 
might our Board members give if the parameters were slightly changed? That is, instead 
of simply asking whether lying was wrong, they were asked whether lying in order to 
save a patient’s life was wrong. This time, we might see some disagreement. Although 
Board members with reasons 1) and 2) above might continue to disapprove of lying, in 
light of the changes to the question, Board members with reasons 3) and 4) might 
reconsider their verdict. Let us look more closely at each possibility:
1) Lying violates God’s eighth commandment (“You shall not bear false witness 
against your neighbor” (The Holy See, n.d., A traditional catechetical formula,
; 8)). Therefore, this Board member may choose to abide by his original decision. 
Alternatively, he could permit lying in this context, because not doing so may 
cause him to indirectly violate the fifth commandment (“You shall not kill” (The 
Holy See, n.d., A traditional catechetical formula, U 5)).
2) A categorical moral imperative is absolute and unconditional. This Board member 
will definitely continue to view lying as wrong.
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3) Not lying would violate the Hippocratic oath -  above all, do no harm. In this 
situation, this Board member will permit lying.
4) In this case, the death of the patient as a result of not lying will likely produce 
more undesirable consequences than those caused by lying. Thus, this Board 
member will likely allow lying.
The slight change in question will cause most Board members to ponder again the ethics 
of lying, and for members with reasons 3) and 4) (and possibly 1)), to alter their verdicts 
entirely. This exercise suggests that the consensus of a group does not necessarily come 
from a collective cognitive agent; the consensus can disguise differences in moral 
justification that come to the surface once the topic of discussion changes only slightly.
Because deliberations of conscience are subjective, there will presumably be 
differences (big and small) among agents as each of them applies different values to a 
situation or weighs different values differently. There may also be differences within 
individual agents themselves, as values are reassessed over time. Therefore, although it 
might be tempting initially to view the decisions of Boards as those of a collective 
cognitive agent, upon closer examination we see that this perception is false. Instead, 
individuals at all levels of an organization such as a hospital, engage in moral reflection 
in an individual fashion. .
Thus, I contend that hospitals do not satisfy the third criterion for conscience. In 
addition, because each criterion is individually necessary for conscience, hospitals 
automatically fail on the larger scale. Assuming that my argument is correct, I could end 
the analysis here and reliably conclude that hospitals do not possess a conscience. But
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since my argument might be flawed, I will move on to consider how hospitals fair with 
respect to the remaining two criteria.
2.3.4 Criterion Four -  Affective Agency
In order for hospitals to have the affective agency needed for conscience, they must 
possess the capacity to experience shame and guilt. Unfortunately, according to Campbell 
(1957) (as cited in Haskar, 1998), the inner life that permits individual persons to 
experience pleasant or unpleasant emotions is precisely what robots, corporations, 
governments and other similar entities lack.
[For] even if they instantiate rational systems or functional systems such that it 
makes sense to attribute actions ... to them, they do not haveTan irreducible inner 
phenomenology. Thus a corporation or state is not joyous and does not suffer (in 
the phenomenological sense) except in the sense that is reducible to the suffering 
and joys of its members (Haskar, 1998, The inner life and the Kantian view 
section, '] 4). ............ ,
From this perspective, hospitals cannot have the mental states required for affective : 
agency. In “contrast to the healthcare professionals” that work within hospitals (Wicclair, 
2011, p. 130), hospitals themselves cannot experience feelings of physical or emotional 
distress, nor can they experience the effects of guilt or shame at the prospect of a 
fundamental loss to th e ir‘moral integrity’. * ^
While this perspective may indeed be correct, hospitals, like many organizations, are 
inherently driven by their membership. As such, although hospitals, as artificial entities 
of the law, may not possess emotions, it is worth considering whether hospitals as 
collective moral agents can. In other words, can the feelings of those within the 
organization amount to a collective or shared sense of guilt or shame sufficiently united
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- and reflective of the entire organization that we can say the organization feels guilt or 
shame?
Most authors currently writing in favour of the moral agency and conscience of 
hospitals do not explicitly touch on whether institutions can feel guilt or shame, though 
one might reasonably assume that if they had, they would have pointed to the possibility 
of a collective sense of guilt or shame within the institution.^ This possibility arises, for 
example, when people who are affiliated with a hospital feel guilt by association when 
the hospital makes bad decisions. Consider the case of hematologist Dr. Nancy Olivieri. 
In 1998, after publishing negative results on a drug she was testing, Dr. Olivieri was 
subject to public attempts to discredit her reputation by the drug company funding the 
clinical trial she was heading (Apotex), her employers (the Hospital for Sick Children & 
the University of Toronto), and various individuals within them. Despite threats of legal 
action and the lack of support from the Hospital and the University -  both anticipating 
continued funding from Apotex -  Dr. Olivieri felt she had an ethical obligation to inform 
her patients and the broader scientific community of the drug’s harmful effects. Dr. 
Olivieri has since been vindicated, but in the years that followed the disclosure of her 
findings, she was nonetheless subjected to continued reprisals from the organizations 
involved (Olivieri, 2001; Thompson, Baird & Downie, 2001, 2005). In this case 
employees of the hospital could easily have felt guilt from being part of an organization 
that acted in such a defamatory and negligent way. There also could easily have been a 
collective sense of guilt within the organization. . ■
I question, however, whether guilt by association is truly collective guilt, as opposed 
to individual guilt that reflects not a collective bad conscience, but individual bad
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- consciences. Consider that the magnitude of guilt felt by the individuals involved will 
presumably differ from one person to the next depending on: 1) their involvement; 2) 
their role within the organization; and 3) their personal value framework (including 
which of their values are core vs. perimeter or peripheral).
Looking back at the Olivieri case, while there may be a minimal base sense of guilt 
felt throughout the organization, individual experiences of this guilt will vary. For 
example, lay members may feel guilty for their association with the organization, but will 
feel less guilt than the administrators who had penned and authorized the defamatory 
allegations against Dr. Olivieri. Similarly, colleagues who stood by Dr. Olivieri . 
throughout her ordeal will feel quite differently than those who abandoned her during her 
time o f need. Individuals’ personal values will also affect their level of guilt. Those who 
deeply value the hospital’s role as a protector of the public’s health may interpret the 
situation differently than those who deeply value its role in promoting clinical research.
Value differences will also influence the pervasiveness of guilt felt across an 
organization. Although in specific cases of gross and obvious misconduct by the 
organization -  such as in the case of Dr. Olivieri -  there will probably be at least a base 
level of collective guilt/shame felt across the organization, in other cases, this may not be 
true. Instead, we might see people at opposite ends of a spectrum on feeling guilt versus 
feeling proud of the organization. A case in point would be that of Sister Margaret 
McBride, a Catholic nun in the United States who was fired from the hospital’s ethics 
committee where she worked and was subsequently excommunicated from the Roman 
Catholic Church after she authorized the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus to save the 
mother’s life (Kristof, 2010). In this case, some employees firmly supported the
i '
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. institution’s decision and felt guilty that such a procedure had been performed in their 
place of work. Conversely, others were appalled that such action would be taken against 
Sister McBride, because what she did conformed to the Church’s doctrine of double 
effect. These staff felt guilty that their place of employment took such severe action 
against Sister McBride. As we see, organizations can be significantly divided, which 
prevents there from being collective guilt, at least across the organization.
Thus, although at times they may be similar, the emotions of those within an 
organization can vary considerably from one person to the next, which means that there is 
not the united manifestation of emotion that is necessary for collective affective agency. 
As we will soon see, these differences among individuals will:also jiffect the possibility 
for collective sanctioning within the organization. ‘ .
2.3.5 Criterion Five -  Internal Sanctioning
As a final requirement for conscience, the entity in question must ultimately be 
subject to internal sanctioning, whereby feelings of shame and guilt are self imposed and 
internally mediated. Once again, while authors writing on the subject do not make 
explicit reference to the ability of such organizations to engage in forms of internal 
sanctioning, they do speak of hospitals as moral agents subject to moral punishment. 
Therefore, in as much as hospitals are moral agents responsible for their actions and 
inactions, so too are they worthy of praise, blame, and the imposition of sanctions 
(Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008). These sanctions may come in various 
forms, and by virtue of a hospital’s role within society, may be the result of impediments 
to the law, intemal/extemal policy standards, political will, etcetera. It is improbable,
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- however, that hospitals would possess the ability to adequately sanction themselves 
internally in a manner that would be representative of conscience. ^ ^
Hospitals, I argue, can only be sanctioned externally or rely on those who work 
within the organization to either sanction one another or submit to the sanctions of their 
own consciences. But to mirror individual conscience, it must be the hospital sanctioning 
itself. This is an important element of conscience as its fundamental role is that of an 
internal mediator whose verdicts are limited to the self and remain distinct from the 
judgments or sanctions imposed by others. Consequently, the pressure of negative public 
opinion, legal, or external policy sanctions could not count as legitimate sanctions of 
institutional conscience. To be sure, a conscience may internalize and later incorporate 
cues from the external environment into its assessment of individual moral 
blameworthiness. Its verdicts, however, will necessarily reflect the subjective experiences 
and values of the individual. ^
Moreover, penalties meted out after employee disciplinary hearings or the like do not 
obviously count as sanctions of conscience, because conscience can tell the employee 
who is punished that she is, in fact, blameless. Individuals can maintain a clear 
conscience, while being found to have violated established corporate policies or even the 
law. Well-known examples include those of Jack Kevorkian regarding his provision of
assisted suicide in the United States (“Jack Kevorkian”, n.d.); the experience of Dr.
■ ; . . .  . . . .  ■ ' . .
Henry Morgentaler regarding his administration of abortions in Canada during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s (“Abortion crusader”, 2009); as well as the case of Robert Latimer, a 
Saskatchewan farmer convicted of second-degree murder in 1994 for what he maintains 
was the ‘mercy killing’ of his severely handicapped daughter, Tracy (“Compassionate
- homicide”, 2009; “Latimer still defends”, 2011). In each of these cases the defendants 
maintained a clear and unaltered conscience and probably believed that they would have 
suffered a worse fate at the hands of their own conscience had they not acted as they did. 
In short, legal sanctions are not sanctions of conscience because they are externally 
imposed and do not reflect each person’s internal deliberations.
While I have established that external sanctions and those imposed by others do not 
clearly count as sanctions of conscience, the question begs to be asked, what of the 
possibility o f a collective sanctioning of conscience? Fortunately the question seems to 
have already been answered. If guilt, shame, or responsibility is not collective, then there 
can be no hope o f collective sanctioning. And if there is no collective sanctioning, there 
can be no collective conscience. Building upon the discussions about the previous 
criteria, I argue there is a lack of compelling evidence that individuals within hospitals 
experience guilt or responsibility collectively. Moreover, the differences in how they will 
sanction themselves preclude the possibility of a collective conscience. ! ; .
2.4 Conclusion
2.4.1 Summary of Findings
Having reviewed the elements necessary for conscience, it seems conclusive the 
dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals possess a conscience. 
Although they were moderately successful in fulfilling criteria one and two, hospitals 




With respect to criterion one, we saw that hospitals could qualify as moral agents that 
are collective in nature. However, in light of the evidence presented about criteria three, 
four, and five, whether hospitals fully meet the criterion of moral agency is now in doubt. 
(Recall that criteria two to five all discuss capacities that are elements of moral agency.) 
At least some hospitals fulfilled criterion two: those that possess well-developed and 
fully-integrated mission statements could claim to have an established set of values which 
contribute to the formation of their identity. In criterion three, hospitals were assessed not 
to meet the necessary requirements, as they do not function as collective cognitive agents. 
Discussion about criterion four revealed that hospitals do not reliably exhibit the truly 
unified and collective sense of guilt and shame necessary for collective affective agency. 
Finally, with respect to criterion five, it was determined that hospitals do not possess the 
ability to impose upon themselves internal sanctions.
From these findings we see that at the very least, hospitals do not meet three of the 
five criteria for conscience. Given that candidates for conscience must fulfill all of the 
criteria, we can reliably say that hospitals do not possess a conscience, as conscience is 
understood according to the dominant view of conscience in bioethics.
2.4.2 Future Focus
Some readers might disagree with me about whether hospitals can possess a 
conscience, perhaps because they do not accept the dominant view. (They might accept 
instead a Catholic view of conscience.) All readers should agree, however, that 
possessing a conscience does not automatically engender a right or entitlement to make 
objections based upon it, or to have those objections respected in all circumstances. Thus,
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even if one assumes that hospitals qualify as having a conscience, one still must question 
whether or to what degree they ought to receive conscience protection. Should Catholic 
hospitals be permitted to conscientiously refuse to provide services within the context of 
the Canadian health care system and in particular, within rural areas? This question will 
be the focus of my next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Catholic Hospital Conscientious Objection
3.1 Introduction
It is a current practice in Canada that religiously affiliated hospitals may 
conscientiously refuse to provide services, therapies, and procedures that contradict their 
guiding religious values. They are generally permitted to do so on the grounds that failing 
to uphold their guiding religious beliefs would compromise their identity and integrity 
(Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008, Wildes, 1997). For Catholic hospitals, these beliefs are 
informed by the principles outlined in the Health Ethics Guide (Catholic Health 
Association of Canada (now Catholic Health Alliance of Canada) [CHAC], 2000), as 
well as the general teachings established by the Roman Catholic Church (e.g., Humanae 
Vitae (Paul IV, 1968), Donum Vitae (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987), 
Dignitas Personae (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 2008)).
Prohibited or immoral interventions include: Abortion; sterilization (e.g., vasectomies 
and tubal ligations) for birth control purposes; cryopreservation; artificial insemination by 
a donor; in vitro fertilization; surrogacy; and “means that deliberately and intentionally 
interfere with the procreative aspect in sexual intercourse” (CHAC, 2000, p.40, article 
50). To varying degrees, these means can include refusals to dispense condoms11,
■ . ■ - »
11 Distributing condoms is a standard practice in public health for reducing the transmission o f HIV/AIDS 
and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) (UNAIDS, United Nations Population Fund, World Health 
Organization, 2009).
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1 'y.hormonal contraception, and emergency contraception (EC) (CHAC, 2000). 
Interestingly, final decisions relating to services that are and are not provided are often 
made by the local Bishop (McGowan, 2005). Differences in opinion or interpretation by 
local Bishops can lead to variability in services offered amongst Catholic hospitals across 
the country. ■ . • .
An important aspect o f any free and democratic society is respect for conscience. In 
Chapter two, however, I argued against the view that such respect is warranted in the case 
of hospitals, as they do not have a conscience according to the dominant view. Hospitals, 
on this view, cannot conscientiously object in a legitimate manner. At the same time, 
even if hospitals could be considered to be entities that have a conscience, continuing to 
provide blanketed protection of their conscientious refusals may represent an 
infringement on the personal autonomy of individual Canadians, and in some cases, 
impose significant barriers to accessing standard reproductive services. Refusals may also 
unjustifiably compromise secular ethical principles, such as those of beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and justice. A v ;
In contrast to the rich debate regarding the proper scope and limits of conscientious 
refusals by individual health care professionals (HCPs), there is relatively little discussion 
on the topic at the hospital level (Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004; 
Gallagher & Goodsetin, 2002; Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy, 12
12 EC is frequently administered as part o f the standards o f practice for treating sexual assault victims who 
present at emergency departments (WHO, 2003; ACOG Committee on Practice Bulletins-Gynecology,
2010).
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- 2008; Wicclair, 2011; Wildes, 1997; Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). While certain 
points of debate may be similar, there are a number of issues that require special attention 
and analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether, and to what degree, 
Catholic hospitals should be permitted to conscientiously refuse to provide reproductive 
services that they morally oppose, within the context of the Canadian health care system 
and in particular, within rural areas. I argue that, in as much as their refusals do not 
disadvantage or impose significant burdens on individuals, the community, or other 
hospitals and HCPs in the service area, Catholic hospitals may legitimately receive some 
conscience protection. However, in cases where significant burdens, limitations, or 
injustices are imposed, or where reasonable and timely access to services is 
compromised, the protection of conscience is no longer ethically justified and limits on 
those protections are necessary. : .  ̂ ;
I propose to fulfill my objective through a two-part analysis. First I will explore 
reasons for believing that Catholic hospitals should continue to enjoy conscience 
protection and second, I will explore reasons for believing that they should not. Through 
my analysis, I conclude that in a number of important circumstances, the reasons against 
protecting the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals outweigh those in favour, and 
that limitations on the conscientious objections of Catholic hospitals are warranted. I end 
by summarizing these key points and suggesting situations in which limitations should be 
imposed.
3.2 Reasons in Favour of Protecting The Conscientious Refusals of 
Catholic Hospitals
In the following paragraphs I will outline a number of reasons in favour of protecting 
the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals and provide additional insight into their 
importance.
One of the most compelling reasons for allowing Catholic hospitals continued 
freedom of conscience, and one highlighted by Wicclair (2011), is the possibility that not 
permitting them this freedom may cause their withdrawal from health care altogether. 
From their perspective, Catholic hospitals are promoting the greater good by protecting 
their own integrity (and from their point of view, that of the general public as well) by. not 
allowing acts that they view to be immoral to occur. Permitting presumed immoral acts to 
occur under their jurisdiction would not only compromise their fundamental religious
i  ' l
beliefs, but signify formal cooperation in evil practices and full moral complicity in the 
illicit act (CHAC, 2000). Being party to these practices may also signify explicit approval 
of the objectionable services, sending conflicting messages to Catholics and the broader 13
13 According to the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000), the principle o f cooperation “applies to situations 
where an action involves more than one person, and sometimes when the persons have different intentions. 
It is unethical to cooperate fo rm a lly  with an immoral act, i.e. directly to intend the evil act itself. But 
sometimes it may be an ethical duty to cooperate m aterially  [also termed legitimate cooperation] with an 
immoral act, i.e. one does not intend the evil effects, but only the good effects, when only in this way can a 
greater harm be prevented” (p.13-14). For example, when done to save the mother’s life, one may consider 
ending an ectopic pregnancy an act o f legitimate cooperation. In this case, the intention is to preserve the 




society regarding what is and is not, morally permissible. Instead of compromising their 
identity and integrity, Catholic hospitals may instead choose to close their doors entirely. 
Unfortunately, as Wicclair (2011) highlights, the most vulnerable would likely 
experience the most detrimental effects of this decision. “Moreover, in some 
communities, the closing of one health care facility [could] substantially reduce 
convenient access to health services for all residents” (Wicclair, 2011, p.132), thus 
placing a higher burden on an already over-extended health care system and leaving other 
hospitals to absorb the backlash. Given the potentially severe consequences of not 
allowing Catholic hospitals to conscientiously object, it is important to examine reasons 
for believing Catholic hospitals are important and why we may value their continued 
involvement in health care. .
First, it is essential to acknowledge the significant contributions Catholic hospitals 
have made throughout the years to both the Canadian health care system, and to the 
health of countless individual Canadians (Humbert, 2004). By not allowing Catholic 
hospitals to continue operating within the Canadian health care system as Catholic 
hospitals not only are we devaluing their legacy and commitment, past and present, but 
we also fail to preserve and respect them into the future. : : ;
Second, with experience also comes a great deal of expertise. Like many religious 
enterprises, Catholic hospitals are especially committed to delivering health care that is 
not only inspired by the ‘healing ministry’ of Jesus Christ, but that also nurtures the 
physical, mental, and social well being of patients and staff, in a manner that treats 
everyone with dignity, compassion, and respect (CHAC, 2000; McGowan, 2005). Since 
the establishment of the first hospital in North America by the Soeurs of the Augestines
-Hospitalières in 1639 (Hotel-Dieu, located in Quebec City, Quebec) (Humbert, 2004), 
Catholic hospitals have provided a number of necessary and beneficial health care 
services across the country. In so doing, they have amassed a wealth of knowledge 
pertaining to various aspects of hospital administration and health care delivery, while 
also leading the way in many areas of health care, including palliative care (Morrison, 
Maroney-Galin, Kralovec, Meier, 2005). Given their depth of expertise and their 
innovative approach to certain health care practices (e.g., palliative care), we can 
continue to learn a great deal from Catholic hospitals. If Catholic hospitals withdrew 
from health care this opportunity for cooperative learning and knowledge exchange could 
be lost.
In a 2011 article focusing on the objections of Catholic hospitals to dispense EC to 
rape victims in the United States, Mark Wicclair14 highlights several additional reasons 
why we might consider continuing to allow Catholic hospitals to conscientiously object. 
First, “it can be important to physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and other personnel to be 
able to practice and work in a community that shares a commitment to a core set of goals, 
values, and principles” (Wicclair, 2011, p. 131). Wicclair (2011) continues to explain that 
for some people, simply working in an organization that permits actions that violate their 
core values could compromise their moral integrity and lead to significant moral distress.
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14 Note. In this same article Mark Wicclair (2011) goes on to argue that despite their claims o f identity and 
integrity, Catholic hospitals have an obligation to “ensure that rape victims, no matter their age, who 
present at the ED [emergency department] have an opportunity to receive information about EC without 
delay and have timely and convenient access to it if  they decide to take it” (p.136).
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-In order to avoid such distress, some people may choose to work in an environment 
where they would be able to avoid such situations. In a case where the alternative is for 
the HCP to move, or discontinue practicing all together (both of which would result in a 
loss to the community), one could argue that having Catholic hospitals serves a greater 
good.
Second, it can be “important to patients to receive care in a facility that is committed 
to their fundamental values” (Wicclair 2011, p.131). Thus for some, knowing one’s 
values are reflected in those of the hospital where one receives treatment, can be 
reassuring and help alleviate stress. Third, “even when they are not hospital or nursing 
home patients, members of a faith community may have an interest-in the existence of 
hospitals that exemplify its fundamental principles” (Wicclair, 2011, p.131). For 
Catholics, administering to the sick and suffering is an important aspect of their Christian 
mission and is an essential part of living out their faith in a modem society (CHAC,
2000; McGowan, 2005).
Fourth, Wicclair (2011) suggests that one could claim - with the notable exception of 
certain outliers such as the Nazi regime - that “the existence of hospitals dedicated to 
upholding perceived moral ideals is intrinsically valuable” (p.131), and that a society 
wherein such moral ideals can be freely promoted is a better society for it. Fifth, such 
hospitals could be interpreted as important to the maintenance and encouragement of 
religious diversity (Wicclair, 2011). In fact, as previously stated, the hallmark of a free 
and democratic society is its nurturing and support of diversity.
Finally, “it might be claimed that insofar as such hospitals have a social mission,
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which is perhaps especially true of religiously affiliated facilities, they promote social 
justice and contribute to social welfare” (Wicclair, 2011, p.131). This may be particularly 
true in the American context (in which Wicclair writes), where Catholic hospitals often 
assume care for those who lack health insurance and those who do not have the resources 
to pay for services out of pocket (Catholics for a free choice [CFFC], 2005). His 
statement is also relevant to the Canadian context, as the preferential treatment of the 
poor and marginalized remains a central value of Catholic health care (CHAC, 2000; 
McGowan, 2005). Respect for social justice and welfare might have been what led the 
Soeurs of the Augestines Hospitalières to first recognize, centuries ago, the need for 
public health care (Humbert, 2004).
Given the many positive contributions Catholic hospitals have made and continue to 
make, as well as the potentially severe consequences of not allowing them to 
conscientiously object, any decision to limit or disallow their objections must be taken 
seriously. One must also soberly assess such a decision against what communities, as 
well as the broader health care system, stand to gain by limiting the ability of Catholic 
hospitals to conscientiously refuse and what they stand to lose through the imposition of 
those same limitations.
3.3 Reasons For Imposing Limits on The Conscientious Refusals of 
Catholic Hospitals
While there are certainly reasons to continue protecting the conscientious refusals of 
Catholic hospitals, there are also a number of important reasons for imposing restrictions 
on these same refusals. In short, just as HCPs are not permitted ‘carte blanche’ when 
conscientiously refusing, nor should Catholic hospitals. In the following section I will 
discuss reasons why we might limit the ability of Catholic hospitals in Canada to make
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conscientious objections. I will explore five main points: the concept of health care as a 
socially-mediated and public enterprise, the potential imposition of beliefs on individuals 
and its effect on autonomy, the use of public funds, the imbalance of conscience, and the 
creation of barriers to access. ;
3.3.1 Health Care as a Socially-Mediated & Public Enterprise
The first reason for placing limits on the refusals of Catholic hospitals relates to the 
special status of health care as a highly valued and socially-mediated service and the 
reciprocal obligations that ensue when endeavouring to provide these services.
In contrast to the American health care system, the Canadian health care system is
largely predicated on a more socialized distribution and delivery of care (Fisher, 2009;
Romanow, 2002). Indeed, for many Canadians, the system’s shared values of “equity,
fairness, and solidarity” (Romanow, 2002, p.xvi), have come to define “their
understanding of citizenship” (Romanow, 2002, p.xvi) and in many respects what it
means to be Canadian. As outlined by the Honorable Roy Romanow (2002):
Canadians consider equal and timely access to medically necessary health care 
services on the basis of need as a right of citizenship, not a privilege of status or 
wealth. Building from these values, Canadians have come to view their health 
care system as a national program, delivered locally but structured on 
intergovernmental collaboration and a mutual understanding of values. They want 
and expect their governments to work together to ensure that the policies and 
programs that define medicare remain true to these values (p. xvi).
This passage highlights the importance Canadians attribute to the equitable and timely
access o f health care services. It also reinforces that, although health care is not a legal or
constitutional right, Canadians have come to understand it as such, or in the very least,
view it as an important social service that should be protected.
By committing to provide health care as a publicly mediated service however, 
governments also assume the responsibility of ensuring the relevant health care needs of 
society are reasonably met. For in as much as a ‘good’ (in this case health care) has been 
shielded from certain pressures of the market, a level of competition and the ability for 
consumers to exercise direct purchasing power over the services they want and need have 
been removed15. In other words, because the publicly funded system in Canada is the 
only option, it must meet the needs of the population it serves in a timely manner, or risk 
being rendered unconstitutional (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002b). This was largely the issue in 
the case of Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) (2005). Although constitutional law 
does not generally recognize positive rights, such as a right to health care, it does protect 
certain negative rights (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002b) -  such as the right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person as outlined in section 7 of the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and 
Freedoms (1982). It is in this respect that challenges to the availability of health care 
services, such as in the cases of R. v. Morgentaler (1988) and Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General) (2005), could be raised. In both these cases, delays in treatment and 
availability were determined to give rise to situations where severe psychological and 
physical suffering could compromise the security of the person. As Supreme Court 
Justices McLachlin and Major, in the case of Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General)
63
15 In saying this I do not pretend that Canadians are unable to have their wants and needs recognized by the 
health care system. Indeed voting in governmental elections, participating in opinion polls or governmental 
round tables (such as those held by the Romanow commission), and joining lobby groups/associations 
focused on specific health needs, are each ways o f having one’s voice heard. What I am saying, however, is 
that individuals are removed from directly  determining market interests simply by their purchasing power.
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(2005), write: .....  : .
The primary objective of the Canada Health Act, KS.C . 1985, c. C-6, is “to 
protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of 
Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or 
other barriers” (s. 3). By imposing exclusivity and then failing to provide public 
health care of a reasonable standard within a reasonable time, the government 
creates circumstances that trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter 105).
While each of these cases deals with particular situations and interpretations of Charter 
rights, taken as a whole they help to clarify what Canadians can reasonably expect from 
their health care system. That is, although there is no specific legal right to health care in 
Canada, by undertaking the role of providing socially-mediated health care services, that 
have the overall effect of a government monopoly, these same governments are 
responsible for ensuring, within reason, that the health care needs of Canadians are 
adequately met. For their part, Canadians can reasonably expect not to be unduly delayed 
or burdened in accessing these services. Furthermore, one could argue that because 
Canadians interpret health care to be a general right (even though technically it is not), 
there is an added element of responsibility on governments (and by extension providers) 
to ensure services properly reflect the public’s needs.
In the same way governments have a responsibility to ensure health care services are 
congruent with the health needs of Canadians, hospitals, by extension, have similar 
obligations to both the governments who grant them this ability and to the society, whom 
they serve. In a 2006 article on the reciprocal obligations of pharmacists and pharmacy 
licensees, which similarly applies to hospitals, Mark Wicclair argues that those who have 
been granted a monopoly by relevant licensing authorities are afforded such licenses with 
the understanding that they will uphold relevant standards and practices, and promote
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specific ends. In the case of pharmacies, and of hospitals, these ends relate to ensuring 
“the public health, safety, and welfare” (Wicclair, 2006, p.228). Therefore, in as much as 
licenses are granted with the expectation that certain relevant requirements to the public 
will be met (e.g., for Canadian hospitals, administering to the needs of the population 
they serve),,in freely accepting such a license, licensees agree to meet them. This is what 
Wicclair (2006) terms the ‘social contract obligation’, as failing to meet the outlined 
terms is a failure to uphold one’s commitments to the licensure as well as to society. In a 
similar respect, Wicclair (2006) notes that an obligation to promote the goals of the 
health care system can also follow from requirements of reciprocal justice. In this case, 
licensees who enjoy specific rights and privileges have a reciprocal obligation to ensure 
the terms of their license are met, otherwise “they do not merit the rights and privileges 
associated with [the] license” (Wicclair, 2006, p.229). Because Catholic hospitals have 
freely chosen to provide health care services as part of the public system, and have been 
granted the regulated (and largely monopolistic) authority to do so, they have a social 
contract and a reciprocal justice obligation to ensure that the requirements of the 
governments who ‘license’ them, and the needs of the population they serve are met. In 
cases where these obligations are not met, limitations may be warranted.16
In urban areas where reasonable access to reproductive services can be maintained by
16 Although licenses can engender obligations in a private system, the obligations on licensees in a public 
health care system are arguably even greater as organizations have freely agreed to participate in providing 
a publicly mediated service that must reflect (within reason) the needs o f the general service population. In 
these circumstances organizations such as hospitals have an even greater obligation to serve public interests 
because they are public enterprises. '
- local hospitals or facilities in close proximity, deferring a Catholic hospital’s 
responsibility to provide reproductive services may be permissible. In these contexts, 
while Catholic hospitals continue to fulfill their obligations to governments and the 
community in other areas of health care, the public safety and welfare are met through the 
general availability of reproductive services elsewhere. Refusals by Catholic hospitals 
will not likely impose significant burdens on the community and may be justified. 
Furthermore, by maintaining a certain level of flexibility in situations where reproductive 
services are otherwise reasonably available, we are establishing an environment of 
mutual respect wherein Catholic hospitals are not unnecessarily made to provide services 
to which they morally oppose. , , , , ,
In rural areas however, where availability of reproductive services cannot be 
reasonably met within the vicinity, deferring the responsibility of Catholic hospitals to 
provide these services may no longer be justified. In these contexts, even though Catholic 
hospitals continue to provide a variety of services, their obligations to meet the needs of 
the community, combined with a lack of general availability to reproductive services that 
meet these needs, may require them (Catholic hospitals) to provide these services. 
Otherwise they may impose significant burdens on the community and fail to meet 
government responsibilities to promote the public health safety and welfare. They may 
also trigger claims under section 7 o f Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (1982).
3.3.2 The Imposition of Beliefs & the Effect on Autonomy
As the potential for the refusals of Catholic hospitals to impose their religious beliefs 
on patients who do not share these beliefs increases, so does the justification for imposing
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- limits on these same refusals.
A guiding principle in medical ethics is respect for autonomy. Consistent with this 
principle, individuals should be permitted to make decisions and to act on their own 
accord free from the constraints of others (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). According to 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) Committee on Ethics 
(2007),
To respect a patient’s autonomy is to respect her capacities and perspectives, 
including her right to hold certain views, make certain choices, and take certain 
actions based on personal values and beliefs. Respect for autonomy has particular 
importance in reproductive decision making, which involves private, personal, 
and often pivotal decisions about sexuality and childbearing (p. 1205).
When conscientiously objecting Catholic hospitals impose their moral beliefs on patients
who do not share these beliefs, respect for the patient’s autonomy is undermined.
Canadians expect hospitals, within reason, to provide medically indicated and 
generalized services that reflect the community’s health care needs. Reproductive 
services are among these services and are often highly valued. In a US national survey 
conducted by Belden, Russonello, and Stewart (2000) a majority of women polled 
believed that community hospitals should provide a broad range of reproductive services. 
More specifically, regardless of an institution’s affiliation with the Roman Catholic 
Church, a majority of women wanted their hospital to offer: medically indicated 
abortions17 (general 87%; Catholics 86%; strongly religious Catholics (SRCs) 82%), birth 
control pills (general 91%; Catholics 90%; SRCs 82%), sterilization procedures (general
■7 Medically indicated abortions are defined as abortions provided when the woman’s life or health is in 
danger (Belden, Russonello and Stewart, 2000).
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85%; Catholics 77%; SRCs 67%), and morning-after pills for rape victims (general 78%; 
Catholics 76%; SRCs 68%) (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2000). In addition, 50% of 
women in general, 48% of Catholics, and 38% of SRCs, expressed support for a 
community hospital that performs elective abortions when the health of the woman is not 
at risk, over a hospital that does not provide this service (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 
2000). While equivalent statistics are not available in Canada, reports suggest that 
approximately: 74% of Catholics in Canada believe “the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
regarding things such as abortion [and] contraception... is dated and out of sync with the 
times” (CFFC, 2004, p.23); 68 % believe the “church should abandon its opposition to 
the use of contraception”(CFFC, 2004, p.l 1); and 72% and 46% respectively believe that 
abortion is ‘not wrong at all’ or ‘wrong only sometimes’ if a fetus has serious defects 
(72%) or if  a family has a very low income (46%)(CFFC, 2004).
These statistics point not only to the general desire of individuals to access 
reproductive services, but to a considerable desire from Catholics to do the same. The 
findings also suggest that Catholics are not homogeneous in their views, and that many 
disagree with the official position of the Roman Catholic Church on reproductive issues. 
It would be misleading therefore to argue, even in cases where a hospital serves a 
pervasively Catholic population, that reproductive services are not desired or warranted. 
Furthermore, even if  it were true that most Catholics in a community did not want their 
hospital to provide certain reproductive services, in a publicly mediated health care 
system, sacrificing the needs of the few simply for the religious beliefs of the many is not 
necessarily ethically justifiable. This is especially true when the sacrificed services are 
easily provided by most hospitals and do not require specialized expertise or machinery
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or can be provided without significant financial costs. Such is the case for many 
reproductive services including EC, sterilizations, and even abortions (both medically 
indicated and elective)(Kaposy, 2010; Trussell, Wiebe, Shochet, Guilbert, 2001).
In health care systems where access to resources is limited, priorities must be 
established. Optimizing scarce resources often requires centralizing specialized services 
in urban centres (Romanow, 2002). Although it is unfortunate that those who live outside 
these centres must travel outside their communities to access certain treatments (e.g., 
radiation treatment) and diagnostic tools (e.g., Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
machines), sustaining costly systems across a vast geography would be impractical and 
place unreasonable financial burdens on the entire system. In the ca.se of Catholic 
hospitals however, decisions not to offer certain medically indicated reproductive 
services are not based on financial limitations or a lack of highly specialized tools and 
staff but instead on religious doctrine. Moreover, the values of the hospital may not align 
with the values of the patient seeking medical attention. In this respect, the degree to 
which refusals by Catholic hospitals constitute an imposition of their beliefs on those 
who do not share them warrants concern.
In urban areas other hospitals in the area will likely provide reproductive services that 
the Catholic hospital does not. Therefore an acceptable level of access to these services 
will most likely be maintained. The availability of services within the area means that 
individuals can go elsewhere without facing significant burdens or impositions on their 
autonomy. Access might be less convenient but is still available.
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Some circumstances that bring people to the hospital however, might be so 
burdensome that something as simple as going elsewhere (even in an urban area) may be 
physically or emotionally unmanageable. When a victim has already experienced severe 
trauma, as in the case of sexual assault, refusing applicable reproductive services would 
only add to the stress of the situation. Providing EC for victims of sexual assault is a 
standard medical practice (WHO, 2003; ACOG Committee on Practice Bulletins- 
Gynecology, 2010). Not providing EC, for those who want it, only limits their autonomy 
and can further victimize already vulnerable individuals by increasing their risk for an 
unwanted pregnancy and possible abortion. It may also expose individuals to having their 
requests for EC made out to be immoral. In these situations Catholic hospitals may have 
an obligation to provide EC, or at the very least facilitate the procurement of EC through 
transportation assistance to a providing pharmacy or hospital. They should also have an 
obligation to fully inform victims about EC so that they can make a fully informed and 
autonomous decision about this option.
In rural areas, the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals will also have a 
significant impact on the ability for individuals within the community to equitably access 
services as well as to exercise autonomy over their reproductive health decisions. In this 
context, the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals comparative to availability of 
services become highly pervasive. Instead of one or two HCPs objecting it amounts to 
hundreds, as each HCP must abide by the hospital’s conscientious refusal policies. When 
hospitals are the sole providers for an area, the choice of whether to go elsewhere is 
effectively removed from the patient, thus diminishing their autonomy as well as their
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- ability to access medically indicated services. The hospital is now acting as the moral 
compass of the community and as such, exercising a monopoly over a public service.
According to Alta Charo (2005) “claiming an unfettered right to personal autonomy 
while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of the public 
trust” (p.2473). This is especially true if people expect to receive certain services and are 
subsequently denied, simply because hospital policy forbids it on religious grounds, or if 
people are not familiar with what is and is not provided within Catholic hospitals. For 
instance Belden, Russonello & Stewart (2000) found that nearly half (45%) of the women 
they polled believed that if admitted to a Catholic hospital, they would be provided with 
the medical services they needed, even if  those services contradictedCatholic teachings. 
In addition, while most women were aware of Catholic restrictions'on abortions, few 
knew that a broader range of reproductive services were also restricted. Only three 
percent recognized that sterilizations were not provided and six percent knew that there 
was no access to EC (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2000). In Canada, determining 
which services are and are not provided at particular hospitals is further complicated by 
the possibility for differences in interpretation of the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) 
by various sponsors and Bishops. ....................
Women and men in rural areas that have secular services also enjoy more 
reproductive autonomy than women in the community that has only a Catholic provider. 
This is a form of discrimination. Even if you were aware of a Catholic hospital’s sole 
provider status when moving to a community you might not be able to live elsewhere, 
and if  you were able to live elsewhere you would have to proactively anticipate which 
services you think you would want or need in the future. This can be highly
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- unpredictable. What an individual thinks they might do in a situation and what they 
actually choose to do in a situation can be very different (e.g., circumstances might lead 
an individual to have an abortion who never thought she herself would elect to have such 
a procedure).
The ability for hospitals to provide health care as a socially mediated good and then 
for them to withdraw certain relevant and highly valued services for religious reasons 
represents an abuse of power. In rural areas, this also represents an abuse of trust as 
Catholic beliefs may be forced on those who do not share similar convictions while 
simultaneously not including the opportunity to go elsewhere. In this environment the 
potential burdens imposed on an individual’s autonomy are significant enough to warrant 
limitations on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals. * ...
3.3.3 The Use of Public Funds
The third reason to consider imposing limitations on the conscientious refusals of 
Catholic hospitals is that, like most hospitals in Canada, they are publicly funded. In fact, 
in 2004, 92% of funding for hospitals came from the public sector (mostly through 
provincial & federal taxes) (Canadian Institute for Health Information [CIHI], 2005). The 
remaining 8% came from various sources, such as private insurance (e.g., for extra costs 
associated with private rooms), ancillary fees (e.g., food services & parking), donations, 
and investments (CIHI, 2005).
Simply stated, when a service is purchased with the taxpayer’s dollar it is no longer 
the sole interests of the institution that should be promoted, but rather the needs and 
values of the public it serves. When organizations enter the public domain, they should
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play by public rules. In Canada, because hospitals are largely funded by the public purse, 
hospitals have a reciprocal obligation to meet the public’s needs. Even when a hospital is 
administered by a Catholic organization, public funds are allotted.
Churches, temples, mosques, and other religious institutions that are privately 
governed, and who serve a specific subset of the population, do deserve to be reasonably 
shielded from laws that would require them to contradict their religious beliefs (e.g., 
forcing the Catholic Church to preside over same sex marriages). Those who seek the 
assistance of these institutions do so of their own free will and can decide not to frequent 
a particular place of worship should they disagree with its beliefs. Hospitals on the other 
hand are public pursuits and even when governed by religious organizations, they should 
be expected to step outside their religious insulation to serve public demands. Because 
Catholic hospitals are publicly funded, they cannot choose those whom they serve, nor 
will they only serve Catholics. (Even if it was allowable to only serve Catholics, as 
previously discussed, Catholics are not homogeneous in theirbeliefs regarding the 
permissibility of different reproductive services [CFFC, 2004].)
Differences between the physician funding framework and the way hospitals are 
funded may also be cause for imposing limits on the refusals of Catholic hospitals. In 
contrast to the majority of physicians in Canada who are reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
basis, hospitals are allocated standard operating budgets, which they are expected to 
distribute across their organization (CIHI, 2005). In most parts of the country, hospitals 
are funded through regional or local health authorities. The amount of funding a hospital 
receives is generally based on a combination of who is served (e.g., proportion of seniors 
in the area), the types of services provided (e.g., is the hospital a trauma centre vs. a
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- general hospital; number of hip replacements, open heart surgeries, transplants 
performed), how much the hospital spent in the past, and whether the hospital provides 
services related to the government’s political platform (e.g., special funding may be 
allocated for priority programs) (CIHI, 2005). Once a hospital’s funding is approved it is 
generally responsible for allocating it as it sees fit. In this respect, while physicians are 
not compensated for services they do not provide, hospitals will continue to receive 
similar, if  not the same, level of funding had they chosen to provide certain basic 
reproductive services (e.g., EC, sterilizations, abortions). By refusing to provide these 
services, not only are Catholic hospitals decreasing overall access to them, they are 
reducing the financial flexibility of surrounding hospitals (since funds that could have 
been allocated to these hospitals must be shared with Catholic hospjtals), while 
simultaneously increasing the burden on these hospitals and their HCPs to provide 
reproductive services more frequently. .....................
Despite a Catholic hospital’s receipt of public funds, and the potential for increased 
financial pressures on other hospitals, reasonable access to reproductive services within 
urban areas will likely be maintained. By continuing to provide services to which they do 
not object, Catholic hospitals are also helping to lower the demand for these services at 
other hospitals. Furthermore, any additional burdens as a result of the Catholic hospital’s 
conscientious refusal will most likely become diluted amongst other hospitals in the area 
so that no one hospital or group of HCPs will be unreasonably burdened.
In rural areas where a Catholic hospital is an area’s sole provider or where accessing 
another hospital would be excessively burdensome, limitations to a hospital’s refusals 
may be necessary, unless reasonable and timely access to those services are made
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available to the community through alternate providers. By operating with public funds 
and not providing basic reproductive services, Catholic hospitals once again exercise a 
monopoly over a publicly mediated service. In rural areas individuals might not be able 
to easily access another hospital, in which case the needs of the population are not 
adequately being met. Furthermore because there are fewer hospitals in rural areas 
(Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008), each 
hospital, assuming they are reasonably accessible, would be required to assume a 
proportionally higher level of burden in providing reproductive services, compared to 
their urban counterparts. In this respect both individuals and hospitals in rural areas are 
being disadvantaged and limits that minimize these disadvantages are necessary.
3.3.4 The Primacy of Conscience Imbalance
A fourth reason for imposing limits on the objections of Catholic hospitals is for what 
I call th e ‘primacy of conscience imbalance’.
If  we accept that hospitals have a conscience, the question must be asked -  is it 
appropriate for the conscience of a hospital to supersede an individual’s? I argue that it is 
not. In fact, it contradicts the very idea of conscience as a personal mediator, responsible 
for one’s own integrity and inner unity and not that of others. For this reason, when the 
conscience of a hospital is allowed to override an individual’s, an unacceptable 
imbalance is created.
Health, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), is a state of “complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity”(1946, p .l). Since contradicting one’s personal moral values can cause serious
- psychological harm and emotional distress, not allowing professionals to heed their 
conscience could result in serious health consequences.
When hospitals conscientiously object, they do so on the basis of religious doctrine 
set out and passed down by sponsoring organizations. HCPs are therefore restricted in 
their ability to necessarily follow the dictates of their own conscience, as they are 
required to work within the ethical guidelines dictated and imposed by the sponsoring 
organization’s religious beliefs. These guiding principles may not accurately represent 
the values of all those employed by the hospital. In order to preserve their conscience, 
some employees may break the rules or resign (Freedman, Landy & Steinauer, 2008; 
Yaworski, 2007) while others may be required to suffer the fragmenting of their 
conscience in silence, as not working is simply not an option they would consider.
Conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals represent an imposition of beliefs from 
the top down simply because of the organization’s religious beliefs and not because an 
intervention would contradict the values of medicine. Arguably the conscience of an 
individual bears a significantly higher moral weight because of the risk to personal 
health. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter two, hospitals do not possess affective agency 
and therefore do not have the ability to experience the same fragmenting of integrity as 
humans. Institutional objections based on hospital policy that constrict the moral views of 
those who must subsequently enforce them impede autonomy and jeopardize the 
potential well being of HCPs who have different values18.
18 O f note these policies also limit the consciences o f patients (e.g. the conscience o f a woman telling her to 
obtain an abortion). Although this is an important topic, in order to limit scope, in this section I concentrate
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While this imbalance is certainly true, it is also true that individuals do not have the 
right to work for a specific organization. For example, I may love books and be an 
excellent salesperson, but I cannot make a local Chapters, or the local public library, hire 
me on these personal criteria alone simply because I want to work there. Nor can I force 
them to continue employing me should I repeatedly contradict their policies. Therefore, 
in urban areas, there may be a strong case for arguing that employees who disagree with 
the Catholic approach to health care should practice in a hospital that more accurately 
reflects their values. Finding a position in another hospital, or transferring to such a 
position may not be easy, but given the high demand for qualified HCPs (Romanow, 
2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a), it will not likely be impossible. Individuals may also 
need to be willing to take a job that is not in the department they initially want or were in 
before as supporting diversity requires flexibility. ........
In rural areas however, or where the hospital is a region’s sole provider, HCPs have 
less choice and flexibility in where they work. Given their specialized skills, and the HCP 
shortage -  especially in rural, remote, and northern areas (Romanow, 2002; Kirby & 
LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008) if  an individual is willing to work in their 
profession they should be enabled to do so. In such cases, the autonomy of the HCP as 
well as the hospital’s duty of beneficence towards society bear an added weight against 
the ‘conscience’ of the hospital, as the HCP’s choice of where to practice is more 
constrained, and losing the HCP would presumably negatively impact the community.
solely on the ethical implications o f the conscientious refusals o f employees to their employer’s 
conscientious refusals.
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3.3.5 Barriers to Access ’
A fifth reason for imposing limits on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals 
is when they affect equitable access to reproductive services. In these cases obstacles 
imposed can become so great that they surpass the status of a mere inconvenience and 
become veritable barriers.  ̂ ' ^
Defining access to health care is contingent upon multiple variables. What might 
constitute reasonable access for one person may present considerable challenges for 
another. Traveling to a hospital 45 minutes away will not likely present considerable 
challenges for an individual with a car, whereas being forced to make the same trip when 
reliant on public transportation can be exceptionally difficult. At times inequalities can 
exist by virtue of their implications. When considering conscientious objections by 
Catholic hospitals, we must consider the “degree to which [refusals] create or reinforce 
an unfair distribution of the benefits of reproductive technology”(ACOG Committee on 
Ethics, 2007, p. 1206) or access to medically indicated reproductive services. In this 
respect, refusals that “unduly burden the most vulnerable of society violate the core 
commitment of justice in the distribution of health resources” (ACOG Committee on 
Ethics, 2007, p. 1206) and may need to be limited.
Barriers to access can present themselves differently depending on the individual’s 
needs and their ability to address those needs. While similar barriers can exist in urban 
areas, in rural communities a number of factors, including geographic distance and the 
lack of health care service options help to amplify the problem (Romanow, 2002; Kirby 
& LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). In rural communities where a
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- Catholic hospital is the sole service provider, or where a merger would confer upon a 
hospital corporation sole provider status, barriers to access can become so great that 
essential services are effectively denied.
A case in point was the removal of tubal ligations from the services provided by St. 
Elizabeth’s Hospital in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, in 2006. If we recall, this procedure 
was found to be contrary to the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) and as such was 
discontinued in the rural community, at first completely and then for birth control 
purposes only (Yaworski, 2007). This decision limits autonomy and poses a risk to 
female reproductive health. The ACOG recommends that an appropriate time for tubal 
ligation is immediately following delivery (ACOG Committee on Practice Bulletins- 
Gynecology, 2003). Religious beliefs prohibiting sterilization for birth control purposes 
may subject a woman to an unnecessary procedure at a different facility. This increases 
the risk of infection, recovery time, cost to the health care system, personal 
inconveniences, and risk of additional pregnancies until the procedure can be completed 
(Fogel & Rivera, 2003).
Accessing health care services in a rural environment is challenging at best. When 
limitations imposed by Catholic hospitals are added, challenges can quickly become 
barriers in which fair and equal services are lost. Rural communities often have higher 
concentrations of low-income earners, higher poverty rates, increased rates of mental 
health issues, lower levels of education, and increased involvement in risky sexual 
behavior resulting in higher rates of teen pregnancy & STIs (CIHI, 2006; Dryburgh, 
2000; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; Romanow, 2002; Pong, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 
2008; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). While the entire community will feel the restriction of
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services by Catholic hospitals, those who are already vulnerable (e.g., women, the 
minimally educated, those of low socioeconomic status, and teenagers) will be 
particularly affected.
In the following paragraphs I will discuss potential barriers to accessing reproductive 
services in the rural environment and how they relate to the diagram shown. Each barrier 
is multi faceted and can present a wide array of challenges. For these reasons a detailed 
discussion of each barrier is warranted. In addition, as figure 2 depicts, while each barrier 
can exist independently, each is also influenced by the broader context (delineated here as 
‘systemic influences’) and interrelated with one another.
Figure 2. Barriers to access
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3.3.5.1 Transportation
Access to public transportation is often limited in rural areas (Romanow, 2002; Kirby 
& LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). Schedules may be sporadic and long 
walks and multiple transfers may be necessary. Roads can often be seasonally affected, 
impacting the ability for individuals to travel from one community to another and the 
speed in which their journey can be accomplished.
3.3.5.2 Cost
Rural areas are characterized by a higher demographic of low-income earners 
(Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008; Pong, 2007; 
CIHI, 2006). While the restriction of services by Catholic hospitals.affects everyone, 
low-income women and those who are poorly educated, are particularly vulnerable.
Many of these people work at lower paying jobs that do not typically carry high security. 
The luxury of sick days is often not an option and it remains difficult to take time from 
work to seek medical services elsewhere. If they do, they experience the double burden of 
pay loss, while concurrently absorbing the financial hardships of travel outside the region 
which is often more costly in rural as opposed to urban areas (Fairbaim & Gustafson, 
2008). Other costs might include: accommodations, meals, as well as child or elder care.
In addition, those with low incomes might not enjoy job benefits that would cover the 
costs of medically indicated pharmaceuticals (e.g., EC) and may be more reliant on their 
local hospital for access to these options. Most hospitals will cover the costs of most 
medically indicated pharmaceuticals when patients are under their care (CIHI, 2006).
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3.3.5.3 Time
The increased time required to access services outside one’s community may impose 
delays on time sensitive interventions. For instance, EC must be administered within 72 
hours or it becomes significantly less effective (WHO, 2004; ACOG Committee on 
Practice Bulletins-Gynecology, 2010). Because a hospital’s catchment area may be large 
geographically, in rural areas one’s local hospital can be thirty minutes away. If this 
hospital is Catholic, and will not provide the service, the next available hospital might be 
hours away, thus making the logistics more complicated.
3.3.5.4 Confidentiality ^
Safeguarding confidentiality in rural areas can be difficult and is identified in the 
literature as an important ethical issue (Nelson, 2004; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008). 
Boundary conflicts due to overlapping roles and close-knit ties within the community can 
remove elements of anonymity and compromise confidentiality (Nelson & Schmidek, 
2008). In some cases leaving the region might also require informing or soliciting the 
help of others. For those who fear severe repercussions from family and friends, 
expanding the circle of trust can be traumatic. :
3.3.5.5 Age
Youth have an increased dependence on others. In rural areas especially, they are 
often further limited in their ability to access services, by costs, access to transportation, 
time, and community values and stigmas. Youth are also generally highly visible in the 
community and along with seniors, represent a disproportionate number of rural 
inhabitants (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). These factors help make their actions and
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- activities more noticeable. For example, failing to show up for school will be documented 
and reported to parents or guardians. Furthermore, when seeking out abortion services, 
teenagers are more likely to use hospitals (Dryburgh, 2000).
3.3.5.6 Health Literacy
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health literacy as the “cognitive and 
social skills which determine the motivation and ability of individuals to gain access to, 
understand and use information in ways which promote and maintain good health” 
(WHO, 1998, p.10). Health literacy is therefore more than being able to read a pamphlet. 
It involves the capacity to access and use the information to make fully informed 
decisions about one’s health (WHO, 1998, p.10; & Peerson & Saunders, 2009).
“Health literacy is itself dependent upon more general levels of literacy” (WHO,
1998, p.10). Those with lower levels of education, cognitive disabilities that affect 
reading and comprehension, and those whose first language is not predominate within the 
region, may face significant burdens navigating and understanding health options 
(McKeary & Newbold, 2010; Newbold & Willinsky, 2009; WHO, 1998). In Canada, 
education and other social variables are strongly associated with one’s knowledge and 
use of reproductive options (Black et. al., 2009; Rotermann & McKay, 2009). As cited by 
Black et. al. (2009), “despite many contraceptive options, Canadian women [including 
rural women] continue to use a narrow range of contraceptive methods and to use 
contraception inconsistently” (p.627). In addition, a 2005 study on knowledge about EC 
in the U.S. revealed that only 67% of women respondents answered that they were aware 
of options to prevent pregnancy after sexual intercourse (Abbott, 2005). Moreover, of
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.those who knew about EC, nearly half were unclear about the correct time constraints (72
/  '
hrs). Many mistakenly believed it must be taken within 24 hours (Abbott, 2005). In 
situations where access to EC is not immediate, this false belief could lead individuals to 
put off attempting to travel elsewhere, believing it is too late.
: Access to detailed information about Catholic hospitals can be hard to find. Easily 
accessible lists of where each hospital is located and what reproductive services each 
provides, do not exist. In many cases, patients are left to creatively investigate what their 
options are and where to go. Patients may alternatively discover first hand what is not 
provided. As previously stated, many women are not fully aware of what services 
Catholic Hospitals do not provide (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2,000). Requesting 
services where they are morally prohibited may subject patients to moral criticism, 
potentially diminishing their autonomy as well as their emotional (and perhaps physical) 
well-being.
In rural areas accessing information on a home computer may be difficult as a number 
of homes are still reliant on dial-up internet or do not have access to broadband internet 
connections (McKeown, Noce & Czerny, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008).
Navigating across multiple high resolution web pages may be time consuming and 
frustrating. Alternatively, accessing information in public may also present challenges. 
Depending on the location of resources (e.g., placement of computers and pamphlets) 
within a building, going to a public library or pharmacy to access relevant information 
can draw attention and reduce confidentiality (e.g., are computer screens easily visible to 
other library patrons; are pamphlets located directly next to the pharmacist or cashier).
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3.3.5.7 Systemic Influences
No system operates in a vacuum. Each of the barriers described will be influenced by 
the broader context. These factors include, but are not limited to the economic status of 
the region, the number of health care providers and institutions per capita, cultural 
diversity, the influence of religious ideologies, various social determinants of health, and 
the present political climate -  regionally, provincially, and nationally.
3.3.5.8 How Barriers Interrelate
The rural health care setting is a unique and challenging environment. As mentioned 
at the outset, while each barrier can exist independently, they are frequently interrelated. 
Together these individual barriers compound and contribute to each other, leading to a 
sum much larger than its constituent parts. This sum contributes to what I term, a total 
‘burden of access quotient’.
For example, a teenager living in a rural area faced with an unwanted pregnancy and 
served by a Catholic hospital, might experience a significant compounding of barriers in 
her attempts to terminate the pregnancy. Because of her age and dependence on others, 
our teenager, not wanting to inform others of her situation, will be forced to take public 
transportation and incur costs she cannot afford. Her absence from school will be noticed 
and relayed to parents, and the bus driver could easily be a family friend. Looking up 
resources online may not be easy because the family computer is located in the living 
room and teachers monitor school computers. Our teenager, expected to be home each 
day between four and five o’clock also has time constraints. Traveling by public transit 
may take too long and not present a viable option.
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When a population who does not have the means is automatically precluded from 
equitable health care, it violates accessibility and justice standards. In rural areas there 
may be a two-tiered system when Catholic hospitals limit the availability of reproductive 
health care services, as these limitations can place potentially insurmountable burdens on 
those most vulnerable. This practice promotes unjust distributions of health care burdens. 
It also violates the public’s interest in comprehensive and unbiased health care. Needless 
to say, in these circumstances, limits on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals 
are warranted.
3.4 Conclusion ■
In a pluralist society, where health care is administered as a public good, institutions 
must practice a wide range of tolerance in order to ensure the needs of the population 
they serve are adequately met. For Catholic hospitals, this requires limiting their ability to 
conscientiously refuse to provide reproductive services to which they morally oppose, in 
circumstances where the needs of the population will not otherwise be met, or where their 
refusals would impose significant burdens on individuals, hospitals, or other HCPs in the 
area.
There are a number of good reasons to protect the conscientious refusals of Catholic 
hospitals. The promotion of religious diversity, the hospitals’ integrity, and respect for 
their legacy and continued contributions to health care are each valid points. As much as 
their contributions are admirable however, their participation in the public system should 
not come at the cost of reasonably accessible health care. Furthermore, while loosing 
Catholic hospitals would represent a significant setback to the Canadian health care
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, system, if  we are committed to the reproductive health and well being of individuals we 
must accept this possibility and implement contingency plans to address it, as opposed to 
simply allowing the threat of withdrawal to override the reproductive autonomy and 
interests of those who ultimately guide and fund the health care system (individual 
Canadians).
As established in the previous discussion, while the implications of conscientious 
refusals by Catholic hospitals may be tolerable in urban areas, in rural areas a strong case 
for imposing limits on their refusals emerges. Given the previous discussion, in order to 
safeguard the autonomy of individuals as well as promote principles of beneficence, non­
maleficence, and justice, refusals by Catholic hospitals must be limited in situations 
where: ‘
1) A Catholic hospital is an area’s sole service provider,
2) Reasonable and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere 
within the community or region,
3) Refusals would impose significant financial burdens on other hospitals in the area,
4) Refusals would impose significant burdens on an individual’s autonomy,
5) An individual HCP who is willing to work in a rural, remote, northern, or 
underserviced area, would have their conscience overridden or negatively 
impacted (when providing medically indicated care or care they feel is in the best 
interests of the patient) by hospital religious policy, or
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6) Refusals would present significant barriers to accessing equitable health care 
services or impose an unjust distribution of care on individuals or communities 
with the least means to overcome such refusals.
In these situations the interests of the public to accessing equitable health care services 
override the interests of the Catholic hospital to conscientiously object and concessions 
on behalf of the hospital must be made.
Although a detailed policy assessment is beyond the scope of this thesis, I encourage 
policy makers to be creative in incorporating these limitations into policy solutions and to 
keep in mind important systemic factors that might affect their decisions. In the 
discussion I offer a number of recommendations in order to providefnsight and to act as a 
launching point for dialogue and debate.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1 Summary of Findings
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the ethical implications of Catholic hospital 
conscientious refusals to provide reproductive services that they morally oppose, within 
the context of the Canadian health care system and more specifically within rural areas. 
To achieve this goal two main questions were identified:
1) Do hospitals possess a conscience according to the dominant view of conscience
in bioethics? ' ' ' '
2) Should Catholic hospitals be permitted to refuse to provide reproductive services 
to which they are morally opposed within the context of the Canadian health care 
system and in particular, within rural areas?
Chapter two began with a brief introduction to the concept of conscience. This was 
followed by a description of the dominant view, and a proposal of the criteria necessary, 
for an entity to qualify as possessing a conscience on this view. Using the developed 
criteria as a framework for analysis, I discussed reasons why hospitals might satisfy the 
requirements of conscience as well as reasons why they do not. Ultimately, I concluded 
that the dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals possess a
conscience, as they fail to meet at least three of the five criteria necessary for it, namely
. , ■ $ ' ' 
cognitive agency, affective agency, and internal sanctioning. For these reasons, upholding
the same respect for conscience and conscientious refusal for hospitals as we would for .
individuals is not warranted, as they do not properly possess a conscience.
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. Because some could disagree with me whether hospitals possess a conscience — for 
instance they may not accept the dominant view -  in chapter three I focused my attention 
on determining whether and to what degree Catholic hospitals ought to receive 
conscience protections. In that chapter I argued that, in as much as their refusals do no 
disadvantage or impose significant burdens on individuals, the community, or other 
hospitals and health care professionals (HCPs) in the service area, Catholic hospitals 
might legitimately receive some conscience protection. However, in cases where 
significant burdens, limitations, or injustices are imposed, or where reasonable and timely 
access to services is compromised, the protection of conscience is no longer ethically 
justified. Although there were valid reasons for protecting the conscientious refusals o f ; 
Catholic hospitals, my analysis of both sides of the debate lead me to conclude that 
limitations are warranted in cases where:
1) A Catholic hospital is an area’s sole service provider,
2) Reasonable and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere 
within the community or region,
3) Refusals would impose significant financial burdens on other hospitals in the area,
4) Refusals would impose significant burdens on an individual’s autonomy,
5) An individual HCP who is willing to work in a rural, remote, northern, or 
underserviced area, would have their conscience overridden or negatively 
impacted (when providing medically indicated care or care they feel is in the best 
interests of the patient) by hospital religious policy, or
91
. 6) Refusals would present significant barriers to accessing equitable health care
services or impose an unjust distribution of care on individuals or communities 
with the least means to overcome such refusals.
In these situations the interests of the public to accessing equitable health care 
services override the interests of the Catholic hospital to conscientiously object and 
concessions on behalf of the hospital must be made.
4.2 Policy Recommendations
Although a detailed policy analysis and set of recommendations are beyond the scope 
of this thesis, there are a number of preliminary suggestions that may serve as a platform 
for more detailed policy proposals. In moving forward, I encourage policy makers to 
consider innovative policy solutions that respect the contributions of Catholic hospitals to 
health care, while upholding the interests of Canadians to access equitable health care 
services. ..••• .
1) Unless Catholic hospitals agree to provide reasonable reproductive services, 
governments may consider not allowing Catholic hospitals to operate in 
environments where they would be an area’s sole provider, or where reasonable 
and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere within the 
region.
2) Where Catholic hospitals are operational, governments should ensure 
comprehensive reproductive services are provided through other means with 
reasonable hours of operation and access.19
3) To help preserve autonomy, all Catholic hospitals should be required to fully 
inform patients of relevant and medically indicated health care options, including 
those to which they morally oppose. Staff should also be required to deliver this 
information in an unbiased manner that focuses on the medical implications of the 
service, as opposed to their perceived moral implications.
4) In cases where patient distress is high, and going elsewhere for services would be 
physically or emotionally unmanageable, Catholic hospitals should have an 
obligation to provide the service or to facilitate transportation to a facility that
can. ' ’ ' ' ' '
5) Disclosure statements regarding what reproductive services each Catholic hospital 
provides and does not provide, should be easily accessible and visible within the 
hospital, as well as posted on their website. Staff should also disclose relevant 
services to which the organization objects and provide the patient with 
information on how to access these services if they so choose.
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19 O f  note, in som e circum stances, reliance on free standing clinics or health units m ay not p rovide adequate levels o f  
access, as their capacity to supply services (e.g., tubal ligations and vasectom ies), o r their hours o f  operation (e.g., I f  a 
w om an is sexually  assaulted on a F riday nigh t w ill the clinic be open? W ill it be open on Saturday or Sunday?) m ay be 
lim ited. Furtherm ore, in rural areas, given the ethical issues surrounding confidentiality, a specialized freestanding 
clinic devoted  to providing these services, m ay  not be a particularly  v iable option.
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6) Where refusals by Catholic hospitals would impose significant financial burdens 
on other hospitals in the area special funding may need to be allocated to these 
hospitals in order to help compensate for the extra burden imposed.
Although these policy proposals are not exhaustive, they provide an important 
starting point for future policy discussions and decisions.
4.3 Applications of Research
To assume that the cases of Midland, Ontario, and St. Elizabeth’s in Humbolt, 
Saskatchewan, were one time isolated incidents would be erroneous. The experiences of 
Midland and Humbolt can be extrapolated to rural (and urban) areas across the Provinces, 
the Nation, and beyond Canada’s borders. -
In the United States, approximately 12.7% of hospitals are Catholic (Catholic Health 
Association of the United States, 2011). Catholic organizations also own 11 of the 40 
largest health care systems in the country (Ascension Health, the third largest system in 
the U.S. counts 78 hospitals in 20 States as part of its organizational structure) (United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, n.d.) and control seven of the ten largest non­
profit hospitals (Fogel & Rivera, 2004). In 1999, there were also 91 counties in the U.S. 
where a Catholic institution was the sole hospital provider (Fogel & Rivera, 2004) and as 
of 2011, a third of Catholic hospitals are located in rural areas (Catholic Health 
Association of the United States, 2011). In many cases, refusals by Catholic hospitals , 
have removed access to a long list of reproductive service options (Fogel & Rivera, 2004; 
Sloboda, 2001). These decisions have effectively precluded entire segments of the ; 
population from services to.which these hospitals oppose.
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Outside North America, the issue of conscientious refusals by HCPs and to some 
extent hospitals, has sparked growing debate, especially in Latin America where the 
Catholic Church exercises a great deal of influence over public policy and health care 
decisions (Casas, 2009; Cook & Dickens, 2009; Cook, Olaya & Dickens, 2009). The 
topic is also relevant to developing countries, where the Roman Catholic Church funds a 
number of hospitals and health outreach programs, which in many cases are the only ones 
in the area (Catholics for Choice, 2008). In Africa for example, this includes funding 
programs targeted at preventing the transmission of HIV/AIDS (a major health crisis in 
the region) but does not include dispensing condoms or educating individuals on the 
merits of their use (Catholics for Choice, 2008). According to a joint position statement 
by UNAIDS, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (2009) “the male latex condom is the single, most efficient, 
available technology to reduce the sexual transmission of HIV and other sexually 
transmitted infections”(p.l).
While each country assumes its own framework of health care administration the fact 
remains -  the denial of reproductive services by Catholic hospitals can easily limit access 
as well as the autonomy of those most in need. For these reasons despite the present 
research having a Canadian focus, much of the analysis also has relevant international 
applications.
In presenting this analysis I trust that it will contribute to and help further the limited 
body of knowledge concerning conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals in Canada, as 
well as to provide targeted insight into its potential impact on rural communities within 
the country. I also trust it will help to spark dialogue and debate regarding this important
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topic, as well as to inform and influence future health policy decisions within Canada and 
abroad. ;
4.4 Future Research
The lack of Canadian research on conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals 
provides for a broad spectrum of possibilities for future investigation. Having presented a 
reasoned, normative analysis on the current situation and proposed limits that ought to be 
imposed ethically, a beneficial future step would be to examine the issue empirically.
Canadian research is needed to explore how individuals within this country interpret 
and experience the refusals of Catholic hospitals as well as their familiarity with the 
topic. Studies that assume quantitative methods as well as those that assume qualitative 
methods would each help to address this need. Questions for future investigation may 
include:
■ What do Canadians expect their hospital to provide by way of reproductive health
options? Do they believe that these same expectations should apply to Catholic 
hospitals? .
■ Are Canadians aware of what Catholic hospitals will and will not provide, and to 
what extent?
■ How are conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals experienced by patients as 
well as HCPs in Canada?
■ How is the experience of Catholic hospital conscientious objection different 
across health care professions, within rural as opposed to urban areas, and across 
different segments of the population?
Research is also needed to more precisely determine the scope of the issue as well as 
to identify areas of interest or ‘hot spots’ across the country. Specific approaches to 
research might include:
■ Surveying Catholic hospitals across the country to determine exactly what 
reproductive services each provides, as well as how often services are not 
provided as a result of hospital refusal policy.
■ This same survey may also ask hospitals to provide insight into the justifications 
behind their policies on different reproductive health services and interventions. 
These justifications can be analyzed in order to identify similarities and 
discrepancies between hospitals across Canada.
O f note, attempts at researching these two questions could be fraught with difficulty, 
as Catholic hospitals may be reluctant to draw attention to what reproductive services 
they have and have not chosen to provide, for fear of sparking controversy or alienation 
on both sides of the debate. In order to increase participation, researchers may want to 
consider removing identifiers from published research investigating the specific practices 
o f each Catholic hospital.
Finally, as suggested earlier in this chapter, policy analyses and recommendations 
should be drafted in order to provide guidance to governments on how they might handle
96
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conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals as well as mergers between secular and 
Catholic hospitals. ,
4.5 Conclusion
The world in which Catholic hospitals operate has changed. Rapid advancements in 
technology have introduced health care options unthinkable twenty years ago. Some of 
these options contradict Catholic moral teachings about the beginning and end of life, as 
well as those related to sexuality and reproduction. While Catholic hospitals continue to 
make significant contributions to the Canadian health care system, their refusals to 
provide reproductive services to which they are morally opposed can compromise an 
individual’s ability to access medically indicated services, as well as their autonomy.
In my analysis of the two guiding research questions I argued that: 1) hospitals could 
not legitimately claim to possess a conscience according to the dominant view of 
conscience in bioethics and therefore could not conscientiously object in a legitimate 
manner; and 2) that the refusals of Catholic hospitals warrant limitations in a number of 
important circumstances, many of which are applicable to rural areas. I trust that this 
analysis will succeed in furthering the limited body of knowledge concerning the 
conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals in Canada, to spark dialogue and debate, and 
finally, to inform and influence future health policy decisions.
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APPENDIX A. Inventory of Catholic Health Care Facilities in Canada
H EA D IN G  D EFIN ITIO N S & COD ES
R ef. # : T he reference num ber assigned to  each health care facility 
F ac ility  (S ite) N am e: N am e o f  the health care facility site
C o rp o ra te  O rg a n iz a tio n  A ffilia tion : N am e o f  the health care organization to  w hich the health care facility  belongs 
(w here applicable)
S p o n so r: N am e o f  the C atholic sponsor
C ity /T o w n : N am e o f  the city  or tow n w here the site is located
P ro v in ce : N am e o f  the province w here the site is located
B C  =  B ritish  C olum bia 
A B  = A lberta 
SK  =  Saskatchew an
M B  = M anitoba ^
O N  -  O ntario 
Q C = Q uebec
N B  =  N ew  B runsw ick .
N S  =  N ova Scotia
N F  =  N ew foundland :
F ac ility  T y p e : D elineates the general type o f  facility , v
H  =  A cute C are (G eneral o r Special) H ospitals 
L = L ong Term  C are Centre 
S =  H ospice
R  =  R etirem ent H om e/R esource Centre 
. N  =  N ursing Station
O = O utpatient H ealth  Services Centre 
A  =  H om e C are ^
T  = T reatm ent ■ ., ■ . - - . ,
P  =  Public H ealth  /M ental H ealth Units
F ac ility  S u b -T y p e : D elineates the m ore specialized focus o f  the facility
Gen. =  G eneral .
R esid. C are Fac. =  Residential care facility 
R ehab. =  R ehabilitation
• H ospice =  H ospice
E xt. C are =  E xtended care ,
N ur. H om e =  N ursing hom e 
A ux. H osp. =  A uxiliary  hospital
R etirem ent H om e =  R etirem ent hom e . . .
Spec. C are H om e =  Special care hom e
Psych. =  Psychiatric
Pers. Care H om e =  Personal C are H om e
H om e for A ged =  hom e for the aged
H om e C are =  H om e care
C hron. “  C hronic
O utpatient C entre =  O utpatient centre 
C om m unity  H ealth =  C om m unity health 
T reatm ent C entre =  T reatm ent centre
S ta tu s : D enotes w hether the health  care facility  is ‘public’ o r ‘p riva te’.
1 =  Public
“A  public hospital is defined as one w hich  is not operated for profit, accepts all patients regardless o f  
their ability to pay, and is recognized as a public hospital by  the province in w hich it is located” 
(C anadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011, p.6).
2 =  Private
“A  private hospital is  defined as one w hich  ordinarily  restricts its adm issions to  patients paying for the 
care provided, at rates determ ined by  the m anagem ent” (Canadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011, p.6).
“A  private long-term -care facility is defined as one w hich ordinarily restricts its adm issions to clients 
(residents) paying for the care provided at rates determ ined by the m anagem ent. H ow ever, there are 
p rivately  operated special care facilities w hich do not restrict adm issions. These m ay be facilities funded 
by a provinvial governm ent, or p rivate individuals w ho have formed a not-for-profit corporation and 
contract w ith  governm ent and associations to provide care” (Canadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011,
p.6).
Y e a r  E s tab lish ed : Y ear the health care facility w as established
B eds: Total num ber o f  beds located at the site -  not including certain specialized beds such as those in operating 
theatres, observation and holding beds, beds located in em ergency, day surgery beds, recovery beds, and birthing beds.
T o ta l A dm issions: “A n inpatient adm ission is defined as the norm al acceptance and reception o f  a  person as an 
inpatient. Such reception involves the allocation o f  a regular facility bed, cot or bassinet” (Canadian H ealthcare 
A ssociation, 2011, p.14).
S taff: T otal num ber o f  full tim e equivalent sta ff w orking at facility site o r em ployed by  the organization
112
113
B u d g e t: “The approxim ate annual cost o f  running the healthcare facility, based on the latest figures available as 
p rovided by  the facility  o r regional board” (C anadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011, p. 14).
A d d re ss : m ailing  address fo r  the health  care facility site :
R eg iona l/L oca l H e a lth  A u th o rity  A ffilia tion : The regional or local health authority to w hich the health  care facility 
site belongs (w here applicable o r listed).
W ebsite : H ealth care facility  o r organizational w ebsite
A d d itio n a l C o m m en ts : A dditional inform ation entered to give insight into the w ork o f  the facility o r other relevant 
inform ation about it -  inform ation entered at the discretion o f  the researcher.
In fo rm a tio n  S ou rce(s): Source o f  inform ation contributing to  the inform ation entered about the facility
G C H F -  G uide to  H ealthcare Facilities in C anada (C anadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011)
CH A C D  =  C atholic H ealth  A lliance o f  C anada [CHAC] D irectory (available online at: 
w w w .chac.ca/alliance/directorv/m em bership-directorv e.php) (CH A C, n.d.a)
C H A O  = C atholic H ealth  A ssociation o f  O ntario [CH AO ] -  m em bers list (available online at: 
w w w .chaont.ca/aboutus/m em bers.php) (C H A O , n.d)
C H C O  =  C atholic H ealth  C orporation o f  O ntario [CHCO] -  m em ber institutions list (available online at: 
w w w .chco.ca/about/m em berinstitutions.php) (C H C O , n.d.)
O W  =  O rganizational W ebsite (specified w here applicable in table)
R ef.# Facility (Site) Name i C orporate  O rganization Affiliation ; Sponsor
040 Saint Boniface General Hospital ■ ■ . ■ . ■ .  ■ , Gatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
041 Winnipegosis General Hospital Inc. . ■ ■ ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
Misericordia Health Centre (1) ;Misericordia Health Centre M isericordia Corporation - Archdiocese o f  Winnipeg
043 Saint Paul’s Home r  . ' ¡Sisters Servants o f  Mary Immaculate
044 Villa Youville Inc. 1- !- - -  : ' -  . '
Ö45 Doctor Gendreau Personal Care Home Inc. 1- ' ■ . . ■ ' •
046 Foyer Valade Inc. I- :. Gatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
047 Holy Family Home Inc. Ì -  . ¡Sisters Servants o f  Mary Immaculate •
048 Saint Amant Inc. - . ICatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
049 Trache Centre . ) - ¡Catholic Health Corporation of Manitoba
050 Saint Joseph's Residence Inc. ■ . Gatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
051 Winnipegosis-Mossey River Personal Care Home Inc. i- . ■ - Gatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
052 Misericordia Health Centre (2) M isericordia Health Centre ¡Misericordia Corporation - Archdiocese o f  Winnipeg
053 Sara Riel Inc. i- Catholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
054 Hôpital de L'Enfant-Jesus RHSJ Í- . . ■ ¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
055 Hôpital Stella-Maris-de-Kent j- Gatholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
056 Foyer Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes Inc. . - ■ ¡Catholic Healtli International (Catholic Health Partners)
Mount Saint Joseph Nursing Home - .  - ■ ' ¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
058 Foyer St. Joseph de St-Basile Inc ■ u ¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
059 Rocmaura Inc. . - Gatholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
060 Saint Patrick’s Mercy Home ■ i - ¡Sisters o f Mercy
061 Saint Martha's Regional Hospital j - ¡Sisters o f St. Martha
062 Saint Vincent’s Nursing Home . ' ¡Roman Catholic Archdiocese o f Halifax
063 Villa St. Joseph-du-Lac ' Gatholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
064 Saint Joeseph's Home Care iSaint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton . iSt. Joseph's Health System
Saint-Vincent Hospital . [Bruyere Continuing Care ;  . ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
066 St. Mary’s o f the Lake Hospital ¡Providence Care Gatholic Health Corporation o f Ontario .
067 Providence Hospital ¡Providence Healthcare Toronto ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
068 Saint Joseph's Hospital ISaint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f  Ontario
069 Saint Joseph's Health Centre Guelph (1) ISaint Joseph's Health Centre - Guelph ¡St. Joseph’s health System Hamilton
070 Parkwood Hospital jSt. Joseph's Health Care London ISt. Joseph's Health Care Society London
071 Hotel Dieu Hospital o f Kingston 1- * / ¡Religious Hospitallers o f St. Joseph
072 Saint Mary’s General Hospital , >  ■ ■ .  .  ̂ iSt. Joseph's Health System .
Mattawa General Hospital 1 -  - -  ■ . Gatholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
074 Pembroke Regional Hospital 1* ■ ■ . ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
075 Saint Joseph’s Health Centre - Toronto '  - ¡Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario
076 Chatham-Kent Health Alliance Ghatham-Kent Health Alliance ¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
077 Hotel Dieu Site ¡Hotel-Dieu Grace Hospital ¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
078 Saint Joseph’s Healthcare -  Charlton Campus iSaint Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton ;St. Joseph’s Health System
079 Saint Michael’s Hospital ISaint Michael’s Hospital iCatholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Ref. # Facility (Site) Name ì C orpora te  O rganization Affiliation : Sponsor
080 Saint Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake ;St. Joseph’s General Hospital - Elliot Lake Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Saint Joseph's Hospital •St. Joseph's Health Care London ¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
082 The Southdown Institute i_ ¡Emmanuel Convalescent Foundation .
083 Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care . r ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
084 Mental Health Services ¡Providence Care . Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
085 Lakehead Psychiatric Hospital ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
086 Saint Joeseph’s Healthcare - West 5th Campus ¡Saint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton ¡St. Joseph's Health System .
087 Regional Mental Health Care - London ¡St. Joseph’s Health Care London |St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
088 Regional Mental Health Care - St. Thomas ;St. Joseph's Health Care London ¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
089 Hotel Dieu Shaver Health & Rehabilitation Centre i- ■ . - ¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
090 Elisabeth Bruyere Hospital : ¡Bruyere Continuing Care Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Saint Joseph's Villa - Dundas ¡St. Joseph’s Health System
092 St. Patrick's Home Ottawa * i- ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
093 Marianhill Home For the Aged . ¡- - . ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario '
094 St. Joseph's at Fleming iFontbonne Society Perterborough
Elisabeth Bruyere Residence ¡Bruyere Continuing Care Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Saint-Louis Residence ¡Bruyere Continuing Care Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
097 Providence Manor ¡Providence Care ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Saint Josephs Health Centre Guelph (2) ¡Saint Joseph's Health Centre - Guelph ;St. Joseph’s health System Hamilton
099 Saint Joseph's Continuing Care Centre Cornwall i- ¡Religious Hospitallers o f St. Joseph
100 Carmel Heights Seniors' Residence ¡Carmelite Sisters o f  Mississauga
101 Mariann Home j- ' ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
102 Saint Joseph’s Continuing Care Centre - Sudbury r ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
103 Good Shepherd Centre ¡Good Shepherd Centres . ¡Good Shepherd Society .
104 Cardinal Ambrozic Houses o f Providence ¡Providence Healthcare Toronto ¡Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario " ■
105 Hogarth Riverview Manor ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
106 St. Joseph's Heritage ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
Saint Joseph’s Lifecare Centre ¡Saint Joseph's Lifecare Centre ¡St. Joseph's Health System
Saint Joseph's Manor ¡St. Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
109 Mount Hope Centre for Long-Term Care ¡St. Joseph's Health Care London ¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
110 Diabetes Health Thunder Bay ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group f 1  Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
111 Saint Joesph's Healthcare - King Campus ¡Saint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton ' iSt. Joseph's Health System
112 Behavioural Sciences Centre . ¡Saint Joseph’s Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
113 St. Joseph's Health Centre ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario
114 Saint Joseph's Hospice Sarnia Lambton ■ ■ ■ ¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London .
115 Good Shepher Centres - Emmanuel House ¡Good Shepherd Centres ¡Good Shepherd Society
116 Stedman Community Hospice ¡Saint Joseph's Lifecare Centre jSt. Joseph's Health System .
117 Balmoral Centre ¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
118 Sister Margaret Smith Centre '¡Saint Joseph's Care Group ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
R ef.# Facility (Site) N ame ! C orporate O rganization Affiliation i Sponsor
119 Saint Michael's Hospital Detoxification Centre iSaint Michael's Hospital ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
120 Oaks Centre Alcohol and Drug Treatment Centre ¡St. Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake ¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
121 Hopital Marie-Clarac > - ' ¡Sœurs de Charité de Sainte-Marie
122 Foyer de St-Celestin ’ ' ¡Soeurs Grises de Montreal '
123 Providence Notrc-Damc dc Lourdes Inc. ‘ ¡Sisters o f Providence
124 Saint Anthony's Hospital • ' ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
125 Saint Joseph's Hospital Estevan ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f  Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
126 Saint Joseph's Hospital - Gravelbourg ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f  Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
127 Saint Peter's Hospital - Melville jCatholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Coiporation
128 Saint Paul’s Hospital (Grey Nuns) o f  Saskatoon . ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
129 Providence Place for Holistic Health Inc. ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f  Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
130 Foyer St. Joseph Nursing Home Inc. ¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan ¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
131 Mont St. Joseph Home Inc. i- ¡Mont St. Joseph Foundation .
132 Saint Joeph's Health Centre - Maklin i- . Sisters o f St. Elizabeth, Humbolt
133 Santa Maria Senior Citizens' Home Inc. ' • ' ¡(Archepiscopal Corporation o f Regina)
134
135 ..................
Foyer d'Youville - Gravelbourg 
Saint Ann's Senior Citizens'Village Corp
¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan 
¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Coiporation 
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
............. -................... — ;-----





R ef.# City /Town ! Province • Facility Type i Facility Sub-Type ! Status I Year Established ; Beds i Total Admissions i S taff i Budget
001
Castor :Gen 11 11911 ¡21 ¡70 i. •
003 Vegreville Ja b ;h
Bonnyville Gen. il 11986 ¡33 . ¡289 ■
005 Camrose a b :h ¡Gen. T ...........; ¡1924 176 '1 2757 ......................... ¡236.2 ' ¡23,597,787...........
006 Edmonton LAB :H Gen. ll 11988 ¡343 ¡57615 ¡1213 ¡140,000,000
007 Edmonton A B ¡H . - . Gen. |l U 969 ¡298 "715060....................... ¡1234 ... ¡138,000,000........
008 Killam A B :H iGen. . Il ' 11930 ¡12.......... L L ■ .
009 ; Edmonton A B L ¡Aux. Hosp. \ \ " r ' : ....... 11927..........1............... 1202........ ¡255.......................... ¡216............. ....¡16,000,000'..............................
010 Bonnyville AB ¡L 1 Nur. Home |1 11986 ¡30 i. i_ '
O il Castor A B “IE"“ '.... .......... ... ¡Nur. Home i f .... ..... . L ' - "121... ........ L
012 Edmonton A B !L ’ ¡Nur. Home il 11895 1502 i- ¡1058 ¡37,000,000 ■
013 Killam A B !L ¡Nur. Home |l il 963 ¡45 j - h
014 Lethbridge A B ;L ¡Nur. Home |1 ¡1929 ¡202 1302 ¡300 ¡9,500,000
015 Lethbridge A B ;L ¡Nur. Home ¡1 !- . ¡200 1- !- . j-
Mundare :Nur. Home 130 ¡15 ¡2,700,000
017 Saint Albert A B ;L 12 11965 ¡191 ¡84
018 - Trochu A B L ¡1 !- - ■- • . . . . . . .
019 Edmonton A B L ¡Nur. Home , il ¡2011 ¡150 ■ . - i- . . . ■ . . . . . . .  .•
020 Calgary . A B ;L ¡Nur. Home il 11910 h i2 ¡46 ..... 1170 r  : : "
¡Nur. Home - ' ¡75
022 Saint Albert - A B  ■ :R ¡Retirement Home |2". ' u ' . ■ ' 141 ‘1 3 3 ......... .......... - ..... ¡45 ....¡2,400,000..... .............. '.... ■.......
023 Lethbridge A B ;R Retirement Home 11 1- ■ ¡118 1- ' * ' 1- ' ” ......... ............ ........... .
024 Vancouver ;BC ]H Gen. il 11946 1140 ‘i-' i- i-
025 Vancouver ¡BC :H ¡Gen. il 11894 =757 ¡23074 ¡3634 ¡470,870,000
026 Comox BC H ;Gen. j l 11913 ¡237 ¡5782. ¡553.5 ¡52,000,000
027 Vancouver ¡BC |H | Rehab. il ¡1947 ¡76 ■ h  ' ■ ‘ j .
028. Vancouver iBC L iResid. Care Fac. 11 11990 ¡ 7 6 ¡23 . .......................... ¡53 - ■ ¡4,700,000 ......1.....................................
029 Vancouver ;b c T ¡Resid. Care Fac. n  . j 1973 i ¡87 ¡30 ¡68 j -
030 Victoria . BC L iResid. Care Fac. j i Il 9 4 1 ................. " ...........T ¡200 ¡70 . . ¡182 ¡16,600 0ÖÖ..........." ...... .......  '  :.......
031 Vancouver ¡BC L ¡Resid. Care Fac. ¡ i  " } i 947 ...............: ............ 1 ¡142 ' i -  ' 1- ~  ~  ' '
Vancouver L iResid. Care Fac. il '* il 946 |I00 ’ •
033 Vancouver BC :L iResid. Care Fac. il ' ‘ 1- ' r Î150 1- . ¡_ i .
034 Vancouver ¡BC L Resid. Care Fac. il . 11991................... |2 2 l1 ¡- I-
035 Vancouver - IBC :L ¡Resid. Care Fac. n .............. 1969 ..................... . |84 ' j- • ' ' . . '
036 Victoria BC iL ¡Resid. Care Fac. il j- ' Il4 1- i -
037 Comox ÎBC !L iResid. Care Fac. 11 ¡1913 ¡125 i- 1-
038 Vancouver ¡Hospice ¡2005 ¡12 =- i-
039 Sainte Rose-du-Lac IMB ;H ¡Gen ;1 ¡1939 126 ¡1222 ¡68 ¡3,200,000
R e f # City/Town i Province • Facility Type : Facility Sub-Type i Status 1 Year Established ; Beds Total Admissions ; S taff ; Budget
040 Winnipeg ¡MB H ¡Gen. 1 11871 ¡485 ■ 23250 ¡4000 ¡250,000,000
Winnipegosis :Gen. ¡1 11966 ¡14 477 ¡1,553,225
042 Winnipeg Gen. ¡1 ¡1898 ¡14 ■ 1- i- .
Dauphin :Pers. Care Home ¡1 11928 ¡70 17 ¡70 14,325,000
044 Pers. Care Home 18 ¡5,800,000 -
Sainte Rose-du-Lac ;Pers. Care Home ;1 ¡1975 ¡65 - 19 60 ¡3,765,135
:Pers. Care Home : 1 j 1976 ¡154 34 ¡147.8 ■ ■
047 Winnipeg IMB ‘ ;L IPers. Care Home 1 ¡1957 ¡276 80 ¡265 1175,000,000
048 Winnipeg ¡MB L :Pers. Care Home ¡1 ¡1959 ¡211 9 ¡1100 ¡60,000,000
049 Winnipeg M 3 :L
jPers. Care Home ¡1 ¡1973 ¡100 35 ¡93.1
051 Winnipegosis ;m b |L IPers. Care Home !1 ¡1981 ¡20 6 715.2................ 1* - '
052 Winnipeg ¡MB |L iPers. Care Home T 11898........................... ¡288 ' ¡60,000,000 "
053 Winnipeg MB ¡Other . - 1 11974 j- . -
054 Caraquet NB :H IGen. 1 11963 ¡12 63 ¡176 ¡12,800,000
055 Sainte Anne de Kent ¡NB ;H ¡Gen. 1 ¡1966 ¡20 321 ¡120 ¡6,800,000
056 Bathurst INB . - ¡l iNur. Home ¡1 30 ¡105 16,620,509
057 Miramichi |NB iL ¡Nun Home :2 ¡1949 ¡133 130 ¡120 17,000,000
058 Saint Basile INB :L INur. Home l 11976 ¡126 38 ¡127 ¡6,711,769
059 Saint John NB ;L Nur. Home l ¡1972 1150 40 ¡180 .
060 Saint John’s INF- L INur. Home ¡1 ¡1958 ¡209 117 ¡197.7 ¡14,288,173
061 Antigonish INS- H ¡Gen. ¡1 i 1906 ¡82 • . 1- ¡-
062 Halifax INS ■ :L ¡Home for Aged ¡2 ¡1966 ¡149 65 1232 ¡10,806,067
063 Yarmouth -NS ■ :L ¡Home for Aged 12 ¡I960 ¡74 36 ¡93.3 ¡5,216,180
064 Hamilton ION :A IHome Care ;1 11921 1- ' . > i- •
065 Ottawa ON iH IChron. ¡1 11924 ¡336 ' i- '
066 Kingston ;ON H Chron. 1 ¡1946 ¡144 792 507 !- : ■ . ■
067 Toronto ¡ON IH Chron. ¡1 ¡1857 ¡347 1800 11700 ¡71,700,000
068 Thunder Bay ¡ON ¡h Chron. 1 ¡1884 ¡224 ¡1526..... ¡1700 ■ ¡125,123,000
069 Guelph •ON ;H IChron. ¡1861 ¡91 -  . GOO ¡28,000,000
070 London ON :H ¡Chron. il ¡1925 1530 ;« ' •
071 Kingston Io n iH IGen. - ¡1845 , j 42 979 "!643 ¡69,000,000
072 Kitchener ON ¡H ¡Gen. 1 ¡¡924 / ¡191
074 Pembroke Io n H Gen. ¡1 . ¡1878 i 178 ¡6000 ¡768 ¡6,873,036
075 Toronto :ON ¡H Gen. il. ¡2470 ¡231,524,000
076 Chatham :ON H Gen. il ¡1890 ¡283 19905 1930 ¡127,000,000
077 Windsor ¡ON h Gen. ;1 ' ¡305 ¡11644 ¡1785 ¡170,000,000
078 Hamilton ¡ON H Gen. 11 ¡1890 . 1459 !- ¡2304.9 [- .
079 Toronto ON H Gen. ; 1 ¡1892 ¡572 ¡575000 ¡3999
_  ■
119
R ef.# City/Town ; Province ! Facility Type Facility Sub-Type Status Year Established Beds Total Admissions i S ta li : Budget
080
082 Aurora ¡ON ill Psyc. 2 1966 48
083
084
Penetanguishene ¡ON ¡H Psyc. 1 1904 312 1079 i860 : ¡70,000,000
Kingston ON H Psyc. 1 1854 198 266 ¡499 -
085 Thunder Bay ¡ON :H Psyc. 1 1944 46 98 46,854,400
086 Psyc.
087 London ON H Psyc. 1 1870 454 73562 705 I-
088
089
Ottawa JON H Rehab. 1 1845 120 - - 123,000,000
091 Dundas ;ON ;L 1
Home for Aged
093 Ottawa ¡ON :L Home for Aged 1 1954 139 - 190 -
094 Peterborough ¡ON :L Home for Aged 1 1959 159 - 118 -
095 Ottawa ¡ON L Home for Aged 1 - 71 - •« ’ .
096
Home for Aged 1 235 - ; s- . !- ,
099 Cornwall ¡ON :L Nur. Home 1 1969
100 Mississauga ON L  Nur. Home
Richmond Hill ON iL Nur. Home
- ■ . : {- . .
105
106
Thunder Bay ¡ON L 












109 London ¡ON I. Nur. Home 1 1869 390 285 i- :
110 Thunder Bay ¡ON O Outpatient centre 1 - ; i- ; - i- -
111 Hamilton ON O Outpatient centre i ' ’ ' -.............. .......'... . . . . / . - - ' L
112
113
Thunder Bay :ON O Psyc. •
Thunder Bay ON P Community Health
114 Sarnia ON S Hospice 1 . • _ 10 - ¡3 -
115 Hamilton ¡ON S Hospice 1 - ■ 10 36 15.2 -
116 Brantford ON S Hospice 1 2005 6 117 - -
117 Thunder Bay ¡ON T Treatment Centre 1 - 22 - -
118 Thunder Bay ON jT Treatment Centre 1 - - 40 i-
R ef.# City/Town ! Province j Facility Type I Facility Sub-Type i Status i Year Established i Beds ; Total Admissions Staff 1 Budget
119 Toronto ¡ON nr ¡Treatment Centre 4 ¡22 12.7
Elliot Lake ■Treatment Centre 4 1» 5 2 -  ■ . '
121 Montreal-Nord QC H ¡Rehab. \ 2 ¡1995 498 4856 ¡303 ¡26,400,000
122 Saint Celestin QC :L ¡Resid. Care Fac. 4 ■1916 ¡52 ¡- 41 •- '
123 Montreal QC L Resid. Care Fac. ■2 i 1934 ¡162 ¡71 . ¡156.8 41,000,000
124 Esterhazy SK |H ¡Gen. 4 ¡1940 ¡22 ¡671 58 ¡2,893,311
125 Estevan ¡SK H iGen. 1 4938 ¡91 ¡2460 491 46,000,000
126 Gravelbourg SK. ¡H :Gen. ¡1 4928 ¡9 ¡591 70 :3,200,000
127 Melville :SK ■ :H ¡Gen. H ¡6,082,410
128 Saskatoon ¡SK - :h ;Gen. ¡1 4907 ¡200 ■ -
129 Moose Jaw SK ; |L ¡Pers. Care Home . 2  ..... . 4995 ¡174 > ' . 1 9 6 ............. ¡11,126,064................................
130 Ponteix ;s k iL ¡Pers. Care Home ¡2 4959 m  ' i 17 30 4,800,000
Prince Albert
Macklin ¡Pers. Care Home 12 4996 ¡26 . . 29 iS 1,253,050
133 Regina iSK ;L ¡Spec. Care Home 4 4968 447 j- 460 ” 4 0,000,boo..........  ..........
134 Gravelbourg ;SK IL ¡Spec. Care Home il 4961 ¡50 ¡- i- i-
135 Saskatoon . :SK L ¡Spec. Care Home 4 ¡1953 ¡79 - ¡74 ¡$3,625,000
136 Saskatoon ISK L ¡Spec. Care Home u i 1965 ¡85 ¡- ¡60
R ef.# Address ; Regional/Local Health A uthority Affiliation W ebsite
001 505 Lynx St. P.O. Box 1050 T IL  1H7 ¡Alberta Health Services www.catholichealth.ca
002 5402 - 47 st. P.O. Box 329 TOC 0X0 ¡Alberta Health Services . www.covenanthealth.ca
003 5241 - 43 st. P.O. Box 490, T9C 1R5 ¡ Alberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
004 5001 Lakeshore Dr. P.O. Box 1008 T9N 2J7 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanllieaith.ca
005 4 0 6 - 53rd st.T4V  1Y5 . ¡Alberta Health Services www.stmarvscamrose.com
006 1100 Youville Dr. W. T6L 5X8 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthca.lth.ca
007 16940-87th ave. T5R4H 5 . ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
008 15203 - 49 ave P.O. Box 40. T0B 2L0 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanlhealth.ca
009 10707 - 29th ave N .W. T6J 6W 1 . ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenantheaUh.ca
010 5001 Lakeshore Dr. P.O. Box 1008 T9N 2J7 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
Oli 5402 - 47 st. P.O. Box 329 TOC 0X0
012 11111 Jasper Ave. T5K 0L4 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
013 5203 - 49 ave P.O. Box 40. T0B 2L0 ¡Alberta Health Services . www.covenanlhealth.ca
014 1400 -9 th  ave S .T U 4 V 5 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthcalth.ca
015 253 Southgate Blvs. T1K 2S1 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenantheaIth.ca
016 Polomark Dr. P.O. Box T0B 3HÛ lAIberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
017 9 St. Vital Ave. T8N lk l ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanthealth.ca
018 451 de Chauney ave. P.O. Box 100, TOM 2C0 i- . ' • www.covcnantheaIth.ca
019 16515-88 ave. NW. TSR 0A4 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenantheaith.ca
020 332 - 146 Ave. S.E. T2N 2A3 ¡Alberta Health Services . www.ilnh.net
021 451 de Chauney ave. P.O. Box 100, TOM 2C0 r  ■ ■ ' wwvv.covenanthcalth.ca
022 1 st. Vital ave. T8N lk l  . 1- , ■ • ■' , - ' www.fbvcrlacombe.ca .
023 950 14 st. S. T U  2Y8 ¡Alberta Health Services www.covenanlhealth.ca
024 3080 Prince Edward St. V5T 3N4 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver www.providencehealthcare.org
025 1081 Burrard St. V6Z 1Y6 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver www.providencehealthcare.org
2137 Comox Ave. V9M1P2 ¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria www.st ghcomox.ca
027 7801 Argyle St. V5p 3L6 ■ ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver . www.provi dene eliealthcare.org
028 704 W. 69th Ave. V6P 2W3 i- - ' . www.columbusresidence.ca
029 3150 Rosemont Dr. V5S 2C9 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver -  ■
030 861 Fairfield Rd. V8V5A9 ¡Vancouver Island Health Author! ly, Victoria www.rntstmarv.victoria.bc.ca
031 7801 Argyle St. V5p3L6 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver www.providencehealthcare.org
3080 Prince Edward St. V5T 3N4 •Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver j www.providencchealthcare.org
4650 Oak St. V6H 4J4 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver / www.providencchealthcare.org
034 255 W. 62nd Ave. V 5X4V 4 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver mvw.providencehealthcare.org
035 4950 Heather St. V 5Z3L9 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver www.nrovidencehealthcare.org
036 2474 Arbutus Road V8N 1V8 ¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria vvww. sisters ofsaint an n e . org/bc/m inistry. h im
037 2137 Comox Ave. V9M 1P2 ¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria www.sjghcoinox.ca ,
038 ’ 900 West 12th Ave. 9th Fl. V5Z 1N3 ¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver www.providencehealthcare.org
039 P.O. Box 60, R0L ISO ¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin -  ,
ZZ
I
R ef.# Address I Regional/Local H ealth A uthority  Affiliation ; W ebsite
040 409 Trache ave. R2H 2A6 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ¡wwvv.sbgh.mh.ca/horne.html
041 230 Bridge St. P.O. Box 280, ROL 2G0 ¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin ■ihtto:/7%'Ww.mareueriteyouviIle.ca/network Wmninegosis.html
042 99 Cornish Ave. R3C 1A2 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ¡hirp://www.rnisericordia.mb.ca/index.html
043 703 Jackson St. R7N 2N2 ¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin i- • -
044 15 Charrìere Rd. R5H 1C9 I - . ' - :  . ■
045 P.O. Box 420, ROL ISO ¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin 1- - >. ■
046 450, eh. River, R2M 5M4 lAutorite de sante regionale de Winnipeg, Winnipeg ¡http://www.mareueritevouville.ca/network FoverVaJade.html.
047 165 Aberdeen ave. R2W 1 T9 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ¡www.holvfamilvhome.mb.ca
¡* ' ¡http://vvww.stamantmb.ca/
049 185 Despins St. R2H 2B3 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ¡htto://www.mareueritevouville.ca/network TacheCentre.htmi
050 1149 Leila Ave. R2P 1S6 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ;http://www'.margueriteyouvilIe.ca/network StJosephsRes.html
051 230 Bridge St. P.O. Box 280, ROL 2G0 ¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin ihttp:/7www.mareueritevouville.ca/network Winnipcgosis.html
052 99 Cornish Ave. R3C 1A2 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg ¡httD://w\vvv.misericordia.mb.ca/index.hrml
053 210 Kenny Street, R2H 2E4 ¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg •www.sararielinc.com •
054 1 boul. St-Pierre Ouest, E1W 1B6 ¡Regie de la sante A, Bathurst . . - ' ‘
055 7714 Rte. 134, E4S 1H5 ¡Regie de la sante A, Bathurst :www.beausejour-nb.ca/English/apropos/mdex.cfm?id=98
2055 prom. Vallee-lourdes, E2A 4P8 •Regie de la sante A, Bathurst 5www.fndl.org
057 51 Lobban Ave. E IN 2W8 i- • ; wvv w. m o u n t sj. c a
058 475 rue Pincipale E7C 1J2 j- .
059 10 Parks /st, E2K 4P1 • - ivvww.rocmaura.com
060 146 Elizabeth Ave. A lB  1S5 ¡Eastern Health St. John's ; www. sprilli f. n 1 .ca
061 25 Bay St. B2G 2G5 ¡Guysborough Antigonish Strait Health Authority #7, Antigonish iwww.gasha.nshealth.ca . .
062 2080 Windsor St. B3K 5B2 . ' ■ : www.svnh.ca
063 - R.R.T, P.O. Box 810, B5A4A5 i- . : www.villasaintioseph.com
064 698 King St. W .,L8P 1C7 : . ¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN wvvw stfosham.on.ca .
065 60 Cambridge St. L1R 7A5 ! Champlain LHIN ; www.bmyere.org
066 340 Union St. W .K 7L5A 2 ¡South East LHIN :www.providencecare.ca
067 3276 S t  ClairAve. E. M IL  1WI ¡Toronto Central LHIN :lY>v2vPr9_>jdence.on.ca '
068 35 Algoma St. N. P.O. Box 3251 P7B 5G7 iNorh West LHIN , ¡www.sicg.net
069 100 Westmount Rd. N1H 5H8 ¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN swww.sjhh.guelph.on.ca
070 801 Commissioners Rd. E. N6C 5J1 , ¡South West LHIN - ¡www.sihc.london.on.ca
071 166 Brock St. K7L 5G2 ¡South East LHIN - / iwww.hoteIdieu.com
072 911 Queen’s Blvd. N2M 1B2 ¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN • iwww.smeh.ca .
073 215 Third St. P.O. Box POH IVO North East LHIN jhttp://www.mattawahospital.ca/english/home/defau!t.htm
074 705 MacKay St. K8A 1G8 . Champlain LHIN ¡www.pemreghos.org
075 30 The Queensway, M6R 1B5 Toronto Central LHIN ¡www.stioe.on.ca
076 80 Grand Ave. W., P.O. Box 2030, N7M 5L9 L ; . . ■ . . www.ckha.on.ca
077 1030 Ouellette Ave. N9A 1E1 Erie St. Clair LHIN . ivwvw.hdgh.org
078 50 Charlton Ave. E. L8N 4A6 Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN ; www. stiosham. on. ca
079 30 Bond St. M5B 1W8 Toronto Central LHIN iwww.stmichaelshospital.com
NJ
R ef.# Address i Regional/Local H ealth A uthority  Affiliation W ebsite
080 70 Spine Rd. P5A 1X2 INorth East LHIN w w w .sish.ca
081 . 288 Grosvenor St. P.O. Box 5777, N6A 4V2 iSouth West LHIN www.sihc.london.on.ca
082 1335 St. John’s Sideroad E. L4G 0P8 - . . .  ■ www.southdown.on.ca
083 . 500 Church St. L9M 1G3 iNorth Simcoe Muskoka LHIN www.mhcn.on.ca 1
, 084 752 King St. W. K7L 4X3 . ISouth East LHIN ........ ................................................................. ’ www.providencccare.ca
085 580 Algoma St. N. Box 2930, P7B 5G4 North Has: L1IIN www.sics.net
086 100 West 5th St. P.O. Box 585. L8N3K7 ¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.stjosham.on.ca
087 850 HighburyAve. P.O. Box 5532, Stn. B ,N6A4H1
089 541 Glenridge Ave. L2T 4C2 Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.hoteldieushaver.ors .
090 43 Bruyere St. K IN  5C8 ' Champlain LHIN www.bruvere.0r2
091 56 Governor's Rd. L9H 5G7 Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.siv.on.ca
092 2865 Riverside Dr. K l V 8N5 ' ¡Champlain LHIN www.stpats.ca
093 600 Cecelia St. K8A7Z3 Champlain LHIN -www.marianhili.ca
094 659 Breakey Dr. K9K 2R8 ¡Central East LHIN www.stioseDhsatilemins.com
095 75 Bruyere St. K IN  5C8 Champlain LHIN . www.bruvere.ors
¡Champlain LHIN .......... www.bruyere.org,
097 275 Sydenham St. k7K 1G7 iSouth East LHIN www.providencecare.ca
098 100 Westmount Rd. N1H 5H8 ¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN www.sihh.cuelph.on.ca
099 ; Champlain LHIN www.stiosephscentre.ca
100 1720 Sherwood Forrest Circle, L5K 1R1 •Missisauga Halton LHIN http://sites.eoo2le.com/site/canneIhei2htsca/home
101 9915 Young St. L4C 1VI ¡Central LHIN http ://\wv\v.rnariannhomc.ors/ .
102 1250 South Bay Rd. P3E 6L9 ¡North East LHIN www.sisudbuiv.com
103 10 Delaware Ave. P.O. Box 1003, L8N 3R1 ¡Hamilton Niagraia Haldimand Brant LHIN www.eoodshcpherdcentres.ca
104 3276 St. Clair Ave. E .M 1L 1W1 ¡Toronto Central LHIN www.provuience.on.ca
105 300 Lillie St. N .,P7C 4Y 7 , ;Norh West LHIN www.sic2.net
106 63 Carrie St. P7A4J2 iNorth East LHIN www.sics.net
107 99 Wayne Gretzky Pkwy. N3S 6T6 ; Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.sjlc.ca
108 70 Spine Rd. P5A 1X2 ¡North East LHIN www.sjgh.ca
109 21 Grosvenor Street, N6A 1Y6 iSouth West LHIN wwvv.sjhc.london.on.ca •
110 285 A  Memorial Ave. P7B 6H4 iNorh West LHIN , j www.sics.net
111 2757 King St. E .L 8G 5E 4 -Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN / www.stjosham.on.ca
112 300 Lillie St. N., P7C4Y7 iNorh West LHIN . www.sjcs.net
113 710 Victoria Ave. E. P?C 5P7 ¡North East LHIN www.sics.net
114 111 Water Rd. N. N7T 7G9 ¡Erie St. Clair LHIN www.stiosephshospice.ca
115 90 Stinson St. P.O. Box 1003, L8N 3R1 ¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.goodshepherdcentres.ca/emmanuelhouse.htni
116 99 Wayne Gretzky Pkwy. N3S 6T6 ¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN www.silc.ca
117 667 Sibley Dr. P7B6Z8 iNorh West LHIN , www.sice.net
118 301 Lillie Street North, P7C 0A6 INorth East LHIN www.sjcs.net
R ef.# Address Regional/Local Health Authority'Affiliation i Website
119 30 Bond St. M5B 1W8 ¡Toronto Central LHIN iwww.stmi chael shospi tal.com
120 9 Oakland B lvd.P5A 2Tl ¡North East LHIN ¡www.sjah.ca
121 3530 Boul. Gouin Est. H1H 1B7 j- . i www.hopitaImarie-clarac.qc.ca
122 475 rue Houde C.P. 90 J0C 1 GO ¡Region 4 - Mauricie et Centre-du-Quebed i- -
123 1870 boul. Pie IX H IV  2C6 • ■ . ' . • - -
124 216 Ancona St. P.O.Box 280 S0A 0X0 ' j- . . • v .. ¡www.catholichealth.ca .
125 1176 Nicholson Rd. P.O. Box 5000 S4A 0H3 ;Sun Country Health Region, Weybum ¡www.catholichealth.ca : stioseohsestevan.ca
126 216 Bettez St. Bag 50 S0H 1X0 ¡Five Hills Health Region, Moose Jaw : www.stiosephshosnitalgravelbourg.com
127 200 Heritage Dr. P.O. Box 1810 SOA2PO ¡Sunrise Health Region, Yorkton ; www.catholichealth.ca
128 1702 - 20th St. W. S7M 0Z9 Saskatoon Health Region, Saskatoon ¡www.catholichealth.ca
129 100 - 2nd ave. N.W. S6H IBS ¡Five Hills Health Region, Moose Jaw ¡www.catholichealth.ca
130 P.O. Box 450 SON 1Z0 ¡Cypress Health Region, Swift Current www.catholichealih.ca
131 777 - 28th st. E. S6V 8C2 ¡Prince Albert Parkland Health Region, Prince Albert ihttD://montstioseph.org/foundation/index.shtml
132 P.O.Box 190SOL2C0 !-
133 4215 Regina Ave. S4S 0J5 ¡Regina Qu’Appelle Health Region, Regina i-
134 216 Bettez St. Bag 50 S0H 1X0
135 2910 Louise St. S7J 3L8 ¡Saskatoon Health Region, Saskatoon ¡www.catholichealth.ca




R ef.# Additional Comments : Information Source(s)
001 Primary Care: acute care, continuing care, matemal/child care, outpatient clinics & palliative care; Births (108) GCHF; CHACD; OW
002 Acute care; Emergency (24hrs); continuing care ■ iGCHF; CHACD; OW
003 Continuing care; Medicinc/Surgery; bbstetricts/GynaecoIogy.; Renal care & Dialysis; 24hr emergency care IGCHF; CHACD; OW
004 Emergency; Aacule & Iona-term care; Palliative care; Cancer treatments • . GCHF; CHACD; OW
Acute care; Births (236); Surgery; Obstetrics; Urology; Ultrasound . ;GCHF; CHACD; OW
006 Acute care; Births (5047); Pharmacy; Ultrasound; 24hr emergency iGCHF; CHACD; OW
007 Acute care: Births (2618); Pharmacy; Ultrasound; 24hr emergency iGCHF; CHACD; OW
008 24hr emergency care GCHF; CHACD; OW
009 Dialysis, Renal care; Elderly; Palliative care; Community day support program IGCHF; CHACD; OW
010 Located at the same site & affiliated with Bonnyville health centre (H ); Long term care & palliative care IGCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly, continuing care, palliative care GCHF; CHACD; OW
012 Continuing care, palliative care; subacute care iGCHF; CHACD; OW
013
014 Continuing care, palliative care; rehab (3 6) GCHF; CHACD; OW
015 assited living IGCHF; CHACD; OW
elderly, Long term care IGCHF; CHACD; OW
018 Elderly aux, care , . IGCHF; CHACD; OW
019 complex continuing care & complex mental health OW
elderly, physically & mentally disabled ; special needs day services IGCHF; CHACD; OW
021 assited living, continuing care
022 Retired Obiates o f Mary immaculate priests and brothers IGCHF; CHACD; OW
023 Retirement Home IGCHF; CHACD; OW
024 Acute care; ultrasound; mannography IGCHF; CHACD; OW
025
026 ..................
Births 1740; Emergency room visits: 77,136; numbers are an amalagamtion o f all providence healthcare numbers . 
Beds: Obstetrics & Gynaecology (9), Intensive care, Pedeatrics, Medicine/surgeigyjPsychiatry; Births: 560 ........-.............. ........ .
IGCHF; CHACD; OW 
.... IGCHF; CHACD; OW .........
027 - . ■ . ' ' IGCHF; CHACD; OW
028 Elderly extended and intermediate care ;GCHF; CHACD; OW
029 - . ■. ■ . ’ IGCHF; CHACD
030 Long term care GCHF; CHACD; OW
031 Located at the same site & affiliated with Holy Family Hospital (H) GCHF; CHACD; OW
032 Located at the same site & affiliated with Mounth Saint Joseph Hospital (H) iGCHF; CHACD; OW
033 - ........................................................................................ :...... ..............: .................................................... - f GCHF; CHACD; OW
034 Long term care / . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly, multilevel care, alzheimers care IGCHF; CHACD; OW
036 Not listed in the GCHF - long term care home for elderly and retired Religious Sisters CHACD; OW
037 Located at the same site & affiliated with St. Joseph’s General Hospital (H) GCHF; CHACD; OW
038 Hospice & palliative care GCHF; CHACD; OW
039 Medicine/Surgery; Paliative Care IGCHF; CHACD
M
ON
R ef.# Additional Comments i Information Source(s)
040 Cardiology;Geriatric rehab; Intensive care; Medicine;Neonatal intensive care; Obstetrics/Gynaecology: Surgery; 24hr emergency care GCHF: CHACD; OW
Medicine/Surgergy; Pediatrics; 24hr emergency care - iGCHF; CHACD; OW
042 24hr urgent care • iGCHF; CHACD; OW
043 Elderly iGCHF: CHACD
Elderly, physically and mentally handicapped GCIIF; CIIACD
045 Elderly . . . . . IGCHF; CHACD
046 Elderly, physically and mentally handicapped . GCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly . GCHF; CHACD; OW
048 Developmentaliy disabled iGCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly and physically handicapped . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
050 Elderly . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
051 Elderly and physically handicapped ;GCHF; CHACD; OW
052 - .. iGCHF; CHACD; OW
053 Mental Health ! CHACD; OW
054 - ‘ ' . GCHF; CHACD
055 - . ■ ' GCHF; CHACD; OW
056 Elderly . GCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly and physically ¡handicapped * . GCHF; CHACD; OW
058 - ■ . . - . . iGCHF; CHACD
059 Elderly and physicaUy& mentally handicapped GCHF; CHACD; OW
060 Nusing & respite care GCHF; CHACD; OW
061 Intensive care; Medicing/Surgery; Psychiatry; Births (483) ■ iGCHF; CHACD; OW
062 Elderly iGCHF: OW
063 Elderly & disabled GCHF; CHACD; OW
064 Home care services . GCHF; OW; CHAO
065 Chronic care . GCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO
066 Continuing Care, palliative care, rehab GCHF; CHACD; OW
067 Acute care iGCHF; OW; CHAO
068 Complex Chronic care; palliative care; Rehab iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
069 Complex continuing care; Rehab; Respite Care . . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
070 . . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
071 Psychiatric and ambulatory care patients . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
072 Intensive care: Medicine/Surgery; Ultrasound; X-ray: 24hr emergency " f iGCHF; OW
073 Chronic care; Medicine/Surgery; pediatrics; 24hr emergency care 1 ¡GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
074 Intensive care.; Maternity; Pediatrics; Psychiatrics; Surgery; Rehab; Medicine; Births (403) iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
075 24hr emergency care . : ÌGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
076 Acute; Chronic Care; Mental Health; Rehab; Women’s and Children’s Health ¡GCHF; CHACD; OW
077 Intensive care; medicine/Surgery; Mental Health; Cariology; 24hr emergency care &  trauma centre . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
078 Continuing care; medicine; Neonatal intensive care; Obstetrics/Gynaecology; Surgery; Births (3513) IGCHF; OW; CHAO
079 - . . . , ■ ■■■■■ • ■ IGCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO
Ref. # Additional Comments j Inform ation Source(s)
080 Intensive care; Chronic care; Med.Surg: Births 84 GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
- ■ . ■ ■ - ■ iGCHF; CHACD; OW
082
Specializes in addressing issues o f addiction and mental health - limited to clergy and the religious (each individual sponsored by a religious community or 
diocese) GCHF; OW
Psychiatric care • GCIIF; CIIACD; OW; CHAO
084 Psychiatric, forenzic and mental health GCHF; CHACD; OW
085 Dementia; Geriatrics; Rehab; Mental health and addictions . GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
086 Formerly Hamilton psychiatric Hospital GCHF; OW; CHAO
087 Mental Health; formerly known as the London Psychiatric Hospital . GCHF; CHACD; OW
088 Mental Health; Formerly known as St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital GCHF; CHACD; OW
Complex Chronic care; rehabilitation GCHF; OW; CHAO
090 Rhabilitation; palliative care GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
091 Elderly ’ iGCHF; OW; CHAO
092 Elderly ' ’ . ¡GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
093 Long term care • GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
094 Elderly; physically and developmentally handicapped iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
095 Elderly GCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO
096 ' iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
097 Elserly and physically and developmentally handicapped iGCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped . GCHF; CHACD; OW
Elderly . GCHF; OW
100 Elderly GCHF; OW
101 Elderly, mentaly handicaped < iGCHF: OW; CHAO
102 Elderly, Long term care iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
103 Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped, EX-psychiatric & emotionally disturbed iGCHF; OW
104
105 ..................
Elderly, physically & cognitively impaired
Elderly, Long term care - - - - ..... .......
iGCHF; OW; CHAO 
GCIIF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
106 Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped . iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
107 Long term care . iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
108 nursing care , GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
109 Long term care GCHF; CHACD; OW
110 Diabetes health and management iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
Formerly St. Joseph's Community Heaith Centre , , i iGCHF; OW; CHAO
112 Counselling ■ r iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
113 Mentai Heatih & addictions GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
114 palliative care & terminally ill iGCHF; OW
115 Terminally ill; palliative care iGCHF; OW
116 Hospice & palliative care . GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
117 Withdrawl management programs; Detox ■ IGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
Additions and mental health: eating disorders; 10 youth beds & 30 adult beds iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
128
R ef.# . Additional Comments I Information Source(s)
119 Detoxification programs - - iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
120 Alcohol and drug treatment; drug vvithdrawl treatment : GCHF; OW
121 - ■ ' • . ■ : ‘ , ■ iGCHF; CHACD; OW
122 Elderly iGCHF
Elderly iGCHF: CIIACD
124 Acute care hospital; 24hr emergency . GCHF; CHACD; OW
125 Intensive care; Long term care; Medicine/surgery/pediatrics; Obstetrics/Gynaecology; Births (320); 24hr emergency care ;GCHF; CHACD; OW
126 Acute care: 24 hr emergency care GCHF; CHACD; OW
127 Acute care; Births (6); 24hr emergency care ‘ GCHF; CHACD; OW
128 Intensive care; Surgery; Medicine; Palliative care; Rehab ÌGCHF; CHACD; OW
129 Long term care; Geriatric Rehabilitation; Day services .. • ‘ ' iGCHF; CHACD; OW
130 Long term care iGCHF; CHACD; OW
131
132 ..................
Long term care; Alzheimer's; palliative care • 
Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped, Long term care, palliative care . ....... ........... — ......—-
■ iGCHF; CHACD; OW 
...  GCHF; CH ACD ......
133 Elderly; Long term care GCHF; CHACD
134 Long term care ; Same site as Saint Joseph’s hospital - Graavelbourg iGCHF; CHACD; OW
135 Nursing Care . iGCHF; CHACD; OW
136 Nursing Care . GCHF; CHACD
